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2ABSTRACT
This thesis intends to be a comphrehensive study of
privatisation undertaken in Hong Kong. It proposes that
the relative success of privatisation appears to be
closely associated with the maturity of the private
sector in financial strength and administrative
competence and a strong middle class.
The thesis first traces its historical development. It
contends that Hong Kong is one of the earliest cases of
the successful introduction of privatisation in the
world, given the traditional laissez faire and non-
interventionist approach of the Government. The fiscal
constraint they imposed had entrenched a set of
conservative budgetary policies which encouraged the
private provision of public services and goods in Hong
Kona since its founding in 1841.
In this thesis, privatisation is interpretea as the
shifting of public functions and activities, wholly or
in part, to private endeavours at the levels of
provision, production, ownership, management,
responsibility, and allocation of resources.
Accordingly, six methods or institutional arrangements
of privatisation can be identified in the case of Hong
Kong, namely, corporatisation, subsidies, voucher
arrangements, contracting, franchises and joint-stock
companies, each of which has its own domain of service
rhnirin_
The thesis then gives a critical and detailed analysis
from the vantage point of public administration.
Three modes of organisation designs for privatisation
are discerned, namely, public corporations, subvented
organisations, and private companies. Each of them has
its own set of power and authority legally prescribed
in its relation with the Government and operation.
In terms of control and monitoring, wnicn is essenidi
for the privatised services, considering the public
interest they are involved, this thesis suggests that
given the political setting of Hong Kong in which
administrative absolutism prevails, the emphasis has
been put on administrative control with the absence or
negligence of legislative and public control, a marked
departure from the Western democracies.
3In terms of the management system and performance, the
privatised services accentuate the use of market forces
in the allocation of resources which on the whole, has
achieved a higher level of efficiency and cost-
effectiveness.
To further theorise privatisation trom the experience
of Hong Kong, our study has also tried to show that the
privatised sector, for whatever the mode of
organisation it encompasses, is quasi-public and quasi-
private in nature with a mix of private business and
governmental elements. In the words of Ira Sharkansky,
the privatised sector exists on the margins of the
state. As such privatisation purports the withdrawal
of the frontiers of the state which would tend to
become a control agency. This trend has been
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Beginning in the early 1980s, a new concept,
privatisation,1 has been received with much
popularity by both theoreticians and practitioners in
the field of public administration. A privatisation
movement, as some scholars put it, has come of age.2
As a widespread phenomenon, privatisation has become a
centerpiece of national policy in some countries--
notably Britain where Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
boldly privatised most of the nationalised industries
and in the United States, privatisation had made a
conspicious appearance on the policy agenda of the
Reqean Administration (1980-1988).3
The spurt of interest in privatisation in that period
in the Western economies has stemmed from a
combination of factors in common to them. The
immediate cause was the world economic recession
precipitated over the mid- and late-1970s, which
imposed severe fiscal constraint on governments to
finance the execution and expansion of public
programmes.4 Economists of the Monetarist school laid
blame for the "stagflation" of the period on the size
2of the public sector. The key policy, to come up as a
solution, is the reduction in the size of the public
sector in order to make room for private sector
investment, that is, the recapitalisation of
capitalism. This ideological predisposition, known as
New Conservatism,5 is primarily a revival of the
classical economic thinking of Adam Smith and a
reaction to the Keynesian welfare state which
advocate government intervention in the provision of
goods and services and the increase of public
expenditure to push up demand.6
Growth of Privatisation in Hong Kong
But Hong Kong has never been a welfare state, as
remarked by an editorial of Welfare Digest, an official
magazine of the Hong Kong Council of Social Services
(HKCSS) its welfare standards are in no way comparable
to the Western economies which have realized the ideal
of meeting the needs of a person from cradle to
grave.7 Privatisation indeed has traversed quite a
different trajectory in Hong Kong from the Western
counterparts.
By historical factor and practical considerations, as
noted by Alvin Rabushka, the Hong Kong Government, to
date, has quite consistently adhered to the nineteenth-
3century values of economic liberalism of the Smithian
tradition in managing the economic and public affairs
of Hong Kong.8 According to his study, the acquisition
of the colony was to serve as a diplomatic, commercial
and military post, rather than a colonial settlement in
the normal sense.9 At the outset, the home government
demanded that the Colony should be self-supporting
financially, which coupled with its free port status to
facilitate trading with China and other neighbouring
countries, had entrenched a set of free-market or
laissez faire economic policies and conservative fiscal
policies persisting until the present day.-0 These
include: 1. The practice and policy of balanced budgets
and low taxation 2. The maintenance of fiscal
reserves, which have historically ranged from one-half
to one year's expenditure 3. The almost complete
avoidance of public debt 4. Habitual underspending by
Government departments 5. A widespread economy ethic
throughout Government 6. A general aversion to central
planning 7. The commercial provision of public
economic services and 8. Minimum intervention in, or
regulation of, the private sector.11
During the pre-war period, when Hong Kong was SL111
relatively underdeveloped and minimally industrialised
with not much revenue, the Government under these
policies had relied heavily on the private sector in
4providing the necessary public services. Thus utilities
like electricity, buses, ferries and tramways, were
initiated by private companies (see Chapter IV). And
most welfare services including education were
sponsored by private charitable and church bodies (see
Chapter III). Incidentally, as pointed out by Lau Siu-
kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, despite the laissez faire stand
of the Government, it has not hampered the post-war
industrialisation of Hong Kong for the timely inflow
of capital and labour from China [especially Shanghai]
on the eve of export-oriented industrialisation in Hong
Kona freed the state from the role in capital
formation, entrepreneurship or labour supply.12 On the
other hand, the externally dependent economy emerged
after the War, in the words of Rabushka, in which the
consequences of an incorrect decision by Government
would quickly come home to roost, and the fact of
almost complete resourcelessness mean that there is
little the Government can do by intervention to alter
the internal cost/price structure of Hong Kong goods to
the benefit of Hong Kong-13
These practical considerations thus encourages a
succession of Financial secretaries in the post-war age
to speak in the language of an eighteenth-century Adam
Smith and a nineteenth-century William E. Gladstone,14
whose thinking and style could bear a deep imprint on
5the economic policy and administration of the
territory-15 John Cowperthwaite, the Financial
Secretary from 1961 to 1971, expressing the heart of
the Government's economic policy, has this say:
One trouble is that when Government gets into
a business it tends to make it uneconomic for
anyone else.i16 For I believe that, in the
long run, the aggregate of the decisions of
individual businessmen, exercising individual
judgement in a free economy, even if often
mistaken, is likely to do less harm than the
centralised decisions of a Government.....It
has to be recognised, and it is recognised
over a large part of our daily life, that the
community's scarce resources can be
efficiently allocated only by the price
mechanism.i17
Echoing that attitude, so even the Government
determined that it had to provide a service to achieve
certain social and economic objectives for one reason
or another, it would try to conduct its affairs with
minimum cost to the general taxpayers. In the mid-
1960s, when withdrawal of overseas financial support
had made it the responsibility of Government to provide
social welfare services, instead of direct provisions,
it sought for the cooperation with the private non-
profit sector through subventions which can effectively
perform needed services at less cost than Government
(see Chapter III). Philip Haddon-Cave, Cowperthwaite's
successor, followed similarly the doctrine of laissez
faire, although he tried to construe it in terms of
positive non-interventionism:18
[T]he Government's involvement in the
6community's affairs has steadily become
prominent over the years, and while I do not
anticipate a greater degree of interference
with the economy, I am sure the degree of
involvement must continue to increase. There
is need in a more complex society to take care
to ensure that private and public sector
activities are in basic accord and there is
much that the Government can, and indeed must,
do if it is to help ensure that a high growth
rate is maintained. This does not involve
planning, macro-economic management and laying
down what private enterprise should do
rather, it means that the Government must
accept such responsibilities as are necessary
to ensure that management decisions are not
frustrated either by unnecessary constraints
or by the absence of facilities and services
which only Government can provide or by
imperfections in the operation of the market
mechanism leading to economic inefficiency or
social distress which only the Government can
remove.1119
To be specific, Haddon-Cave goes on:
This intervention takes the form of the
provision of the classical services of law,
order and regulation, a few publicly-owned
public utility undertakings (but operated on a
quasi-commercial basis), a massive public
housing programme, a fairly well-defined range
of infrastructural investments, a few
publicly-financed promotional bodies and,
finally ublicly-financed and managed social
service. 0
Haddon-Cave had during his terms of office pioneered,
among others, the construction of the Mass Transit
Railway and the incorporation of the MTRC, a privatised
structure operated strictly on commercial lines in 1975
(see Chapter II). He was replaced by John Bremridge in
1987 who upheld the same stance as his predecessors:
Hong Kong has prospered under a system of low
taxation with services paid for by those who
use them. There seems to me much evidence in
the world that increase of public expenditure
7reflecting relatively kind-hearted transfer of
cost from the user to the taxpayer at large is
both inflationary and counter-productive."21
In his opinion, privatisation means:
"[T]he Government should not be involved it
activities that can arguably be done better it
the private sector. Recent examples of this
approach can be seen in the Tuen Mun Light
Rail System, the Eastern Harbour Crossing and
Hong Kong Nuclear Investment Company. The sam
our approach to car parks. Nevertheless the
perceived advantages of privatisation have to
be balanced against the morale of the civil
service and the considering costs of
disestablishment. Pragmatic, rather than a
theoretical judgement is therefore essential-
one fruitful avenue, given our very successful
value for money studies plus the need to
constrain the growth of the civil service,
will be the contracting out of services."22
The other aspect of the laissez faire approach to
economic affairs, besides a non-interventionist stance,
is the conservative fiscal policies. Given the low
taxation and the narrow tax base to facilitate free
trade, the Government has habitually spent only what
it can afford."23 Central to its economic and financial
policies is that public expenditure should not be
allowed to grow faster than the underlying growth of
the economy.24 As a result, the Government has managed
to contain the relative size of the public sector to
this stands at 14.9 per cent, comparing with 34 per
cent for the United States, 45 per cent for West
nPrmanv, 47 ner cent for Britain and 38.3 per cent for
arguments apply to existing services. Thus
less than 20 per cent of the GDP (Table 1.1). In 1980
8Table 1.1
The Size of the Public Sector (current prices)
Consolidated
Account GDP Relative Size
Expenditure (HK$ million of the Public
Fiscal Year (HK$ million) per calendar year) Sector(%)
1949-50 7.2204 (a) 2,805 (b)
1950-1 218 3,356 6.5
1951-2 255 3,434 7.4
1952-3 296 3,174 9.3
1953-4 322 3,330 9.7
1954-5 375 3,574 10.5
4051955-6 3,927 10.3






























Sources: (a) The Consolidated Account expenditure data for iygy- a to ,yoy-iv
arc taken from H.C.Y. No, The Fiscal System of Hong Kong
(London, Croom Helm, 1979), p. 24.
(b) The GDP data for 1961 to 1986 are estimates by the Census and
Statistics Department. Those for 1949 to 1960 are estimates by K.R.
Chou adjusted according to the 1961 estimate by the Census and
Statistics Department.
(c) The Consolidated Account expenditure data for 1970-1 to 1985-6
are taken from The 1985-86 Budget Speech (Hong Kong Govern-
ment).
(d) Forecast taken from same source as (c).
9Table 1.2 Percentage of Public Expenditure

























Source: R.A. Musgrave and P.B. Musgrave, Public
Finace in Theory and Practice, Mcgraw-Hill,
1984, p.138.
Singapore (Table 1.2). Moreover most years have
registered budget surplus. In the 32 years from 1949-
1981, deficits only appeared thhree times (in 1959-60,
1965-66 and 1974-75, see Table 1.3 ). So to speak there
are great fiscal conyraints on the capacity of the
Government to deliver more services to the people.
Although public expenditure on social services
10
Table 1 .3
General Revenue Account and Fiscal Reserves (HK$ million)
Ratio of Fiscal ReservesFiscal Reserves atSurplus(+)
Start of Fiscal Year to Expenditure(%)Fiscal Year Revenue Expenditure Deficit(-)
4072+ 821822641949-5 (a) 61154+ 402522921950-1 70193+ 332763091951-2
71222+ 733123851952-3 84297+ 423553971953-4
102380+ 613734351954-5
107431+ 524034551955-6 96449+ 404705101956-7 93496+ 525335841957-8 ' 91539+ 395906291958-9 84599- 457106651959-60 64545+ 148458591960-1
n.a.n.a.+ 779531,0301961-2 57631+ 1401,1131,2531962-3 62797+ 991,2951,3941963-4 62900+ 781,4411,5181964-5 54961- 1371,7691,632-1965-6 46826+ 121,8061,8181966-7 48848+ 1341,7661,900.-1967-8 49---_-926'+ 2081,873.2,0811968-9 541,087+ 4492,0322,4811969-70
581,426+ 6192,4523,0711970-1 (b) 712,066+ 6402,9013,5411971-2 822,916+ 1,2193,5504,7691972-3 673,089+ 3734,6445,0171973-4 47
-380 2,8095,9735,5931974-5 422,552+ 2326,0236,2551975-6 432,810+ 9176,5777,4941976-7 463,713+ 1, 2258,1589,3831977-8 454,949+ 1,48610,95612,4421978-9 456,416+ 2,97513,82116,7961979-80 479,339+1,15119,67530,1871980-1 5715,300+ 6,691,26,79533,4941981-2 6723,1283,55834,57431,0161982-3 5618,695- 2,95433,35430,4001983-4 4315,750- 1,46336,38134,9181984-5 4015,300- 1,15538,30837,1531985-6 (c)
Sources: (a) Figures for 1949-50 to.. 1969-70 are taken from the Annual Report (Hong Kong Government, various issues.
(b) Figures for 1970-1 are taken from The 1985-86 Budget Speech (Hong Kong Government).
(c) Forecasts taken from the same source as (b).
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(education, medicine and health, housing, social
welfare and labour) has since the 1970s accounted for
40-50 per cent of the total (Table 1.4) and had a
growth of 104 times in real terms in the past 35 years
from 1949-50-- 1984-85,25 this however represents 8-10
per cent of the GDP, a rate much lower than other
industrial economies. Thus expenditure on medical and
health services in Hong Kong only accounts for 1.8 per
cent of the GDP, comparing with 8-10 per cent for
countries in Western Europe (Table 1.5).
Such being the case, for the sake of cost-saving ana
reduction, apart from the provision of infrastructural
facilities, the Government has tended to eschew the
direct involvement in the delivery of public and social
services which were either handed over completely to
the private sector like most of the public utilities or
delegated the management and production functions to
private bodies. In 1982 the Kowloon-Canton Railway
Department, a Government agency registering losses for
many years, was converted, the first of its attempt,
into a corporation separated from the public sector.
Within two years, profit was turned out (see Chapter
II). The success of the privatised railway won wide
acclaim from the Government and the Legislative
Council, which urged for the switch of more public
functions especially those failing ones, to private
12
Table 1.4
Consolidated Account Expenditure, 1976-7 to 1984-5
1976-7 1980-1 1984-5
HK$ million HK$ million HK$ million
Recurrent account 5,786 78.7 13,404 60.8 29,252 71.4
Capital account 1,569 21.3 8,652 39.2 11,692 28.6
972 13.2 2,424General services 11.0 5,993 14.6
Security services
241 7.21,590Defence 3.3 1,511 3.7
0.7299144 0.5Immigration 38 0.5
717 1,627 7.4 8.33,3689.7Law and order
12.715.113.5 3,331 5,178996Sub-total















Source: The 1985-86 Budget Speech (Hong Kong Government).
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Table 1.5 Public Expenditure on Health over
GDP(%).











.1.8 (184 figure)Hong Kong
Sources: (a) Trend in Public Expenditure on Health,
OECD, Paris, 1982.
(b) Hong Yong Yearbook, 1985.
provisions-26 The unexpected collapse of land revenue
in 1982 resulting in four consecutive years (1982-86,
see Table 1.3 above) of budget deficits further fuelled
the momentum of privatisation. In 1983 Government car
parks were contracted out to a private operator to be
followed by the Kennedy Town abattoir, both of which
have incurred losses and posed a drain to public funds
in the past (see Chapter III).
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Until lately, in the Report entitled Public Sector
Reform submitted by the Finance Branch for
Government's deliberation in February this year (1989),
due emphasis, among the numerous recommendations or
raising the value for money, has been laid on divertinc
some of the service departments to the private sector
in order to cut back on Government spending and cope
factor.27 The extra considerations, on non-economic
ground and the truth of which cannot be wholly
precluded, are the perceived depolitisation of public
administaration to reduce the political pressure the
Government faces in the transitional period and
curtailment of the administrative power of the future
SAR government.28 At any rate, regarding the historical
development of privatisation in Hong Kong, it can be
aptly summed up that the substance of privatisation has
been existing in Hong Kong for very long only the name
is derived in the 1980s.
The Nature of Public Goods and Services
Privatisation in fact highlights not only a programme
of administration, but also a different perception of
the state, national development and a different set of
with the forcast coming of a world economic slump is
the early 1990s and recession induced by the 1997
15
ideology. In the first place it is a belief that
business is better.29 The private sector, it is
argued, will perform functions more efficiently and
economically than the public sector. The intellectual
root of privatisation, as noted by Ronald C. Moe, is
found in political economy.30 The Public Choice school,
in studying the nature of public goods and services,
expresses its espousal of privatisation.31
Barry Bozeman has suggested all organisations are
public. He contends that the public and private sectors
are alike in the essentials, different only in the non-
essentials.32 However, it is widely agreed that the
distinction between them is one of degree which can be
portrayed in a public-private continuum.33 Vincent anc
Elinor Ostrom have derived two central properties tc
distinguish the public and private goods and services
in their ideal forms, excludability and joint
consumption.34 Excludability refers to the level of
control that both buyer and seller have over a
particular commodity i.e., how easy it is to excludE
users or owners from using or owning a particular gooc
or service. For instance, a lighthouse has a very lov
level of excludability. All ships passing it car
benefit from its service. But a meal in a restaurant
has a high level of exclusive control by the buyer it
pro marketplace.Joint consumption refers to the idea
16
that some goods and services may be used or consumed
jointly and simultaneously by many customers without
being diminished in quality and quantity, while other
goods are available only for individual (rather than
joint) consumption. A fish is an example for a good
subject to individual consumption and conversely,
telephone service is one exhibiting the charateristics
of joint consumption.35 By constructing a matrix from
these conceptual pairs, we get a four-part combinations
(see Fig. 1) which E.S. Savas classify them as
follows:36






Case I: Collective goods and services (public safety,
pollution control, consumer protection, trade
industrial promotion, weather forecasts)
are jointly consumed goods and services for
which exclusion is not feasible.
Case II: Toll goods and services (telephone cable
17
services, transport carpark facilities,
education, medical welfare services,
electricity gas, libraries) are jointly
consumed goods and services for which
exclusion is feasible.
Case III: Common-pool goods and services (fish in the
ocean, air to breathe, water in a public
well) are individually consumed goods and
services for which exclusion is not feasible.
Case IV: Private goods and services (a haircut, a meal
in a restaurant, a bag of groceries) are
individually consumed goods and services for
which exclusion is feasible.37
Cases I-III in fact denote some variants of public and
semi-public goods and services in the public-private
continuum which are the arena privatisation takes
place. Their provision and production are customarily
the responsibility of the public agencies or
government. Market is composed of individuals and firms
seeking to maximise their own self-interest. It
determines the supply of private goods whilst the
allocation and distribution of public goods are
dictated by politics which describes the struggle
between groups seeking favourable public policy, the
demands for such policy being framed in the public
r4- Aral ct MnrPnvPr the interaction pattern of market is
18
governed by competition whereas that of the public
sector is hierarchical.38 Aaron Wildavsky has aptly
stated:
"Government-produced goods (public goods) are
not traded on the market; provision is
determined by politics. A decision is made
that we need some good or service the market
is failing to supply, or supplying in less
than an optimal quantity, and the government
invokes the power to transfer resources
necessary to produce it. Thus there is no
market allocating mechanism to assist us in
arriving at an efficient level of
production, nor to bestow an objective
(collective value on the goods. And although
we frequently can price what we put into
public goods, this price is obviously not
the same as the value of the benefits
bestowed inputs are not necessarily
outcomes."39
Anthony Downs similarly has this to say:
Because bureaus do not have economic output
markets, they cannot evaluate the costs of
producing their output or its value on this
external basis. The bureau's income is not
directly related to the services it
provides. As a reault, the bureau's ability
to obtain income in a market cannot serve as
an objective guide to the desirability of
extending, maintaining or contracting the
level of expenditures it undertakes. Nor can
it aid the bureau in determining how to use
the resources it controls, or in appraising
the performance of individual bureaucrats.
In short, the major yardsticks for decision
making used by private firms are comp4etely
unavailable to those who run bureaus.
In a hierarchical pattern of interaction, the way of
goods and services delivery by the state is mandatory.
Individual preferences for diverse services are
overruled; the public budget and taxation necessary to
fund the state's activities are prescribed more
19
essentially, individuals no longer have the choice as
to whether they wish to consume or pay for the good, so
that producers' interests predominate at the expense of
consumers' liberties. As a remedy, privatisation is
seen as a means to foster and maximise individual
preferences.41
Typical public goods, as mentioned, by their nature arE
used simultaneously by many people and on one can bE
excluded from enjoying them. An individual has ar
economic incentive to make full use of such goods
without paying for them and without contributing a fair
share of the efforts required to supply them. Mancur
Olson calls this a free rider phenomenon.42
Efficiency as an Evaluative Criterion
It is commonly held that the public sector is less
productive relative to the private sector because of
inferior efficiency. Red tape, overlapping command,
lack of initiative and responsiveness and still others
have accounted for the administrative inefficiency of
the public agencies. According to Public Choice
theorists, bureaucratic behaviour is driven primarily
by budget-maximising considerations. As J.T. Bennett
and M.H. Johnson argue, Every bureaucrat is inherently
an emire builder who seeks to enlarge the size and
20
scope of his agency in order to increase status and
salary.i43 Economic efficiency is the least cost
notion of efficiency. It is achieved when the value of
what is produced by any set of resources exceeds as
much as possible the value of resources.44 The
incentives for economic efficiency are largely, if not
totally, absent in the public sector. On the contrary,
the reasons for increased efficiency in the provision
of goods and services by private agencies are generally
epitomized by the following terms:45
1. Competition among firms leads to efficiency in
the production of goods and services
2. Service boundaries can be defined on the basis
of economic considerations (e.g. economies of
scale) rather than political decisions
3. Elasticity in demand (as a function of price)
leads to the most efficient provision of goods
and services and
4. Managers of private sector firms have incentives
for efficiencies not present in the public
sector.
None the less it has to be notea zndU in NUUllV
activities, efficiency often is not the single and in
some circumstances, the most appropriate evaluative
criterion. For one thing, public goods involve strong
externalities or spill-over effects, and high social
21
cost should negative externalities occur. The outcome
or effectiveness of the public policy is gauged by its
ability in meeting social needs, such as equity in the
allocation of welfare services.46 Private provisions of
public goods and services might result in trade-offs
between efficiency and effectiveness, and between cost
and quality. The Pareto Optimality therefore envisions
efficiency as a state of affairs in which a change in
economic organisation will make everyone better off
without making anyone worst off, that is to say,
improving the economic condition of one person without
harming the economic condition of another-47 In the
public sector, efficiency, more often than not, should
not be taken indiscriminately by its face value.
Definitional Issues
The word privatisation itself is an umbrella term
with different ramifications of meanings. Narrowly
defined, the Thatcher Government of Britain uses it to
refer to the transfer of state ownership in
nationalised industries to the private sector.48 By
imposing further restriction on the meaning, Peter J.
Curwen, using the' term interchangeably with
de-nationalisation, takes it as the transfer of at
least 50 per cent of the shares in a nationalised
industry from public to private hands.49 Many others
22
however will not treat privatisation simply as a matter
of the transfer of public assets. Alan Walker, in
behavioural terms, suggests that privatisation may be
said to take place when responsibility for a service or
a particular aspect of service delivery passes, wholly
or, in part, to the private sector and when market
criteria, such as profit or ability to pay, are used to
ration or distribute benefits and services.50 Some
authors have tried to appraise privatisation by
analyzing the different facets of goods and services.
Savas found that a service is consisted of two
components: the service producer-and service arranger.
The service producer is the agent that actually and
directly performs the work or delivers the service to
the consumer the service arranger is the agent who
assigns the producer to the consumer or selects the
producer who will serve the consumer.51 Somewhat build
upon Savas's, Ted Kolderie differentiates goods and
services into the production and provision
dimensions-52 In the same vein, so are the two other
aspects, management and ownership, which can be two
separate elements in a good or service. Privatisation
henceforth may be graphically intrepeted as below:
23






Politics Market6. Allocation of
resources
Privatisation
Privatisation is envisaged at the levels of provision,
production, ownership, management, responsibility and
resource allocation, whenever any or all of those
shift to the private sector, the right column in Fig.
2. In a comprehensive sense, privatisation therefore
describes a multitude of government initiatives
designed to increase the role of the private sector by
turning over or shifting the above functions, wholly or
in part, to it in the delivery of public goods and
services.
Margins of the State-- The Privatised Sector
Implicit in the privatisation initiatives is the
rolling back of the frontiers of the state. As Ira
Sharkansky succinctly puts it, Modern states are both
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growing and withering. They grow in response to
incessant demands for more services they wither as
officials assign important activities to bodies they
enjoy formal grants of autonomy from the state.i53 The
privatised concerns discharge functions outside the
borders of the state. They are set apart from purely
public and private roles but entail both features
pertaining to the public and private sectors. In other
words, the privatised sector is quasi-public and quasi-
private in nature their entities exist in a grey area
on' the margins of the state, to use Sharkansky's
terminology, which are vastly different from the core
departments of government.54 Put generally, with some
exceptions in each case, they are not represented on
a government's organisation chart and directly
responsible to the head of the state and the executive
branch their employees are not members of the civil
service and their expenditures do not appear in the
government's budget either. Taking Hong Kong as a
case, this thesis will be devoted to a study of that
special sector operated on the margins of the state,
with particular focus on the various strategies and
methods of privatisation furnishing alternative ways
of provision of public goods and services.
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The Alternatives
In line with foreign experience, different
institutional arrangements, as alternatives to direct
government provision and production, can be discerned
in the quest for privatisation in Hong Kong. We
identified six methods or strategies through which
privatisation is proceeded by the Government as
presented by the following table:




Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC)
Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC)
Hong kong Housing Authority
*Hospital Authority
Hong Kong Productivity Council
Hong Kong Export Credit Insurance
Corporation
Land Development Corporation (LDC)
Hong Kong Industrial Estates
Corporation
Vocational Training Council
Hong Kong Trade Development Council








Tung Wah Group of Hospitals
Po Leung ICuk, etc.
The Bought Place Scheme (BPS)
3. Voucher Arrangements
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The School Medical Service Scheme





*Tunnel management (Lion Rock Tunnel Aberdeen
Tunnel)
*Life-savings for swimming pools beaches
*Chemical waste treatment plants
*Kowloon Bav Refuse Transfer Station
5. Franchises
Public Utilities:
Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (KMB)
China Motor Bus Co. (CMB)




















In the Chapters which follow, we shall give a critical
review to each of these alternatives, namely,
corporatisation subsidies, voucher arrangements and
contracting and franchises and joint-stock companies,
in that order. Due regard, besides the explanation and
oval„atn of each category, will be put on the legal
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framework and the political setting in which the
structures in the privatised sector, namely, public
corporations, subvented organisations and private
companies, operate. As noted by Harold F. Gortner, et
al., public organisations are executors of laws which
establish the policy, direction, or the goals of
bureaus, thereby spelling out what is expected in the
way of outputs or results.i55 By contrast, in private
or business organisations, it is assumed 'that the
organisation will operate within the general parameters
established by society', and that is all that matters.
No further comment on the law is required.56 In this
respect, the quasi-public and quasi-private
organisations existed in the privatised sector, in
discharging functions and duties involving public
interest, are close to public bureaus in the adherence
to laws to regulate their activities. In the following
discussions, we shall show, as far as possible, how the
Government, through legislations and other legal
arrangements, defines the proper organisation designs
and the due managerial processes and procedures
especially on financial matters pertaining to these
organisations. Focus will be put on the control and
accountability mechanism as spelled out in the
subsequent relationships they entail with the
Government. Gortner, et a1., has also differentiated
the control systems for organisations into two layers:
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the internal control which is oriented toward control
within the organisation, and the control by the larger
environment of external actors including public
officials, legislative bodies, regulatory agencies and
organised interest groups-57 Our analysis will
concentrate on the external layer of organisation
control. In the conclusion, we shall try to summarise
the patterns observed from these different
institutional arrangements that constitute the
privatised sector in Hong Kong, and their implications,
both theoretical and practical.
As such, this thesis is an attempt, which is also its
main theme, to derive a typology of the methods of
privatisation undertaken by the Government in Hong
Kong, and to give a detailed and critical account to
each of the categories in terms of such topics of
public administration as organisation structure and
design, monitoring and control, power and authority,
and management system and performance. And the major
thrust of arguments in this and subsequent chapters
which the auhtor intends to put forward is as follows:
(a) Privatisation has been a common phenomenon in Hong
Kong since its founding in 1841, given the laissez
faire and non-interventionist approach of the
Government, which stands in sharp contrast with the
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Western countries.
(b) Privatisation, as a process of shifting the
provision of public goods and services to the
private sector, can be interpreted at the levels of
provision, production, ownership, management,
responsibility and resource allocation.
(c) From that definition, six methods or institutional
arrangements of privatisation can be identified in
the case of Hong Kong, namely, corporatisation,
subsidies, voucher arrangements, contracting,
franchises and joint-stock companies each of them
has its own domain of service choice.
(d) In terms of the formal design, the moae or
organisation through which the above-mentioned
methods of privatisation take place include public
corporations, subvented organisations and private
companies, each of which has entailed a prescribed
set of power and authority in its relation with the
Government and its operation.
(e) In terms of monitoring and control, given zne
political setting of Hong Kong in which
administrative absolutism prevails, the emphasis
is put on administrative control with the absence
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or negligence of legislative and public control.
(f) In terms of the management system and performance,
the privatised services are based in various
degrees on market forces in the allocation of
resources, stressing efficiency and cost-
effectiveness which, on the whole, most of them
have achieved.
(g) As can be shown by the Hong Kong case, the
privatised sector is quasi-public and quasi-private
in nature with a mix of private business and
governmental elements which exists, in the words of
Ira Sharkansky, on the margins of the state.
(h) Privatisation implies the withdrawal or 'ME
frontiers of the state which has tended to becomE
a control agency. This trend can be increasingly
witnessed in Hong Kong.
(i) Privatisation seems to be related to a more
advanced level of socio-economic development which
could provide a mature private sector in terms of
administrative competence and financial strength





This chapter will examine corporatisation, one of the
mehtods of privatisation employed particularly by the
Government of Hong Kong. It will begin with an analysis-
of the origin and the legal and institutional
attributes of public corporations-- the resultant
structure of corporatisation, followed by a discussior
of some of the examples-- can be divided into twc
types-- in terms of the formal design, control and
accountability mechanism, and management system and
performance, as aforementioned.
In the final section of the McKinsey Report,
Strengthening the Machinery of Government, of 1973,
it has been suggested that the Government should hive-
off parts of its functions and structure such as
airport, railway, water supply and postal service, in
order to improve their performance and reduce the load
on the central administrative machinery.1 According to
the Report, Government's role in the activity is then
limited to setting overall standards and determining
key factors such as prices in all other respects the
agencies are managed independently by their own Board
and staff.i2 Colin Sankey, the Principal Assistant
Financial secretary who, for the time being, conducts a
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group in the Finance Branch to undertake a study or
privatisation, coined this process corporatisation
which in his account, is a category of privatisation
through the transfer of assets to a separate entity,
thus vesting day-to-day financial and operational
decisions outside of Central Government and obvious
examples being the MTRC and KCRC.3 Both the Report and
Sankey have virtually pointed to the creation of a not
quite new species of organisation named the public
corporation popularly found in Western countries in
recent decades.4
Public corporation, as a peculiar form of organisation,
was evolved over a long period of time in history.5 On
the other hand, the theory of public corporation only
finds its earliest expression at the turn of the
century-6 Scholars like Marshall E. Dimock, W.F.
Willoughby, A.C. Pigou, J.M. Keynes, Herbert Morrison
and Harold Seidman, to name a few of them, have
successively written on the subject to polish the
concept .7 The Crawford Committee on British
broadcasting industry of 1926 had first used the term
public corporation, which proposed that the
[broadcasting] services should be conducted by a public
corporation acting as a trustee for the national
interest with the object to bring an important
industry or service within public control without
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making it an ordinary government department.5 There
is as yet no general code of rule governing this form
of organisation which is indeed quite unnecessary as
the particular statute giving its creation may vary
from one another in details for each industry and in
different countries. None the less, the essence of the
public corporation seems to reside in the following
legal and institutional attributes:9
1. The public corporation is created by or under the
authority of an Act of the legislature, consisting
either of a special charter or of a general
permissive statute.
2. The public corporation is an artificial being, and a
juristic creation of law. Being the mere creature of
law, it possesses only those properties which the
enabling instrument confers upon it, either
expressly or as incidental to its very existence.
Among the most important are its specific powers,
duties, immunities, form of management and its
relationship to the government and with other
established institutions.
3. Unlike a normal type of goverment agency the public
corporation is a separate entity for legal purposes,
and customarily can sue and be sued, can enter into
contracts and acquire property in its own name.
4. The public corporation has neither public nor
private share-holders. The whole nation is, in a
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symbolic sense, the share-holder and is represented
by its parliament and government.
5. To keep it free from political pressures and
frequent government interferences, its
administration is entrusted to a board of directors
who are appointed according to the provisions made
in its enabling act. The nature of boards may vary
according to the nature of the enterprise entrusted
to it. The board of directors is not expected to
interfere in the detailed management of the
corporation, which is the job of the general manager
or the managing director.
6. The public corporation, by virtue of its commercial
functions, should have freedom from treasury
controls, except for any appropriations required for
the provision of capital or the meeting of losses.
Usually, public corporations are given the right to
use subscribed capital, to raise new capital, to
utilise operating revenues to defray operating
expenses, to provide working capital and to build up
reserves.
7. In matter of personnel, the corporation should have
considerable freedom of action and should not be
subject to the civil service rules. All
appointments, terms and conditions of services
should be strictly according to efficient business
enterprise principles.
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8. Public corporations are usually given the power to
determine the character of and necessity for their
expenditure, and the manner in which this is
incurred, and paid. They are thus exempted from most
of the regulatory and prohibitory statutes
applicable to the expenditure of public funds. Their
funds usually do not end with the fiscal year.
9. The accounting system of public corporations normall
follow private commercial practice and are designed
to reflect all costs properly attributable to their
operations.
1O.The accounts of public corporations are audited by
some competent authority as prescribed in their
governing statutes. The auditing is according to the
principles and procedures applicable to commercial
transactions.
11.All public corporations, although they are separate
legal entities, are yet accountable to the public
through the public's representatives in the
government and parliament, according to rules laid
down in their enabling instruments.
In Britain, public corporations, entitled by a wiae
variety of names like Council, Board,
Corporation, Commission, etc, grew in large numbers
since the post-war era of nationalisation which are the
standard mode of organisation for the nationalised
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industries.-0 The Amercian public corporation, also
known as the special authority or public authority,
has largely flourished at the state and local levels of
government. They employ 3 per cent of the national
labour force and control four fifths of the local
public transportation systems, three quarters of the
country's water systems and a fourth of the electrical
blants and railwavs.11
As Peter J. Curwen puts it, the nationalised industries
are all public corporations, but not all public
corporations are nationalised industries.12 As a
corporate device, the public corporation is like a
double-edge sword which, depending on the mode of
formation, could be the organisational structure for
both nationalisation and privatisation. After all,
being quasi-private and quasi-public in nature, that
implies it is a middle-range structure which can either
hA a nationalised or a privatised institution.
In Hong Kong, the first public corporation to appear
was the Hong Kong Tourist Association, thereafter, a
few more have come into existence especially since the
1980s, in line with the hiving-off and corporatisation
policy. In chronological order by date of incorporation
or commencement, they are set out below:13
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Table 2.1 Public Corporations in Hong Kong.
Name of Corporation
21 June, 1957Hong Kong Tourist Association
30 Sept., 1966Hong Kong Trade Development
Council (TDC)
23 Dec., 1966*Hong Kong Export Credit
Insurance Corporation
20 Jan., 1967*Hong Kong Productivity Council
26 Sept., 1975*Mass Transit Railway Corporatior.
(MTRC)
1 March. 1977*Hong Kong Industrial Estates
Corporation
15 July, 1977**Consumer council




15 Jan., 1988*Land Development Corporation
(LDC)





Broadly speaking, two types of public corporations can
be discerned: One is the revenue-yielding varieties
such as the MTRC, KCRC, LDC, Housing Authority and
Hospital Authority, which are liable to a return in
pecuniary terms by virtue of services and goods they
provide, and may become financially self-sufficient,
displaying various degrees of financial independence.
The other is the non-revenue-yielding public
corporations such as the Consumer Council, which render
free services to the public and do not have any source
of income of its own but rely wholly on Government




reason, their behaviour can be closely monitored by
Government wihtout the danger of running out of control
like their revenue-yielding counterparts. Moreover as
can be seen from the following discussions, the latter
have tended to adopt more or less a profit-oriented
approach in management and operation, which will not be
found in them.
Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC)
The MTRC was created by ordinance in September, 1975
which, giving its legal status, has specified that the
Corporation is not the servant or agent of the Crown
and does not enjoy any status, immunity or privilege of
the Crown and shall have perpetual succession and a
common seal and be capable of suing and being sued.14
The principal activities, conducting according to
prudent commercial principles, as of 1987, are:15
(a) the operation of a mass transit railway with
lines from Central to Tsuen Wan, from Yau Ma Tei
to Kwun Tong, and from Chai Wan to Sheung Wan
(b) related commercial activities, including the
letting of advertising space and marketing of
commercial franchise on the system, property
management and property development both for
investment and for resale and
ft-N tbo nlannina and construction of extensions to
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the railway including, currently, involvement in
the construction of the Eastern Harbour
Crossinci_
All shares are alloted to the Government, the sole
share-holder, in the name of The Financial Secretary
Incorporated which as at 31 March, 1988 has subscribed
a total of $8.1 billion by instalments, with $2.5
billion unpaid shares outstanding, callable if needed
and approved by Government.16 The administrative
apparatus of the Corporation is the Board of Directors,
members of which including the Chairman and Managing
Director, are all appointed by the Governor. In 1987 it
consisted, of the nine members, Michael Leung Man-Kin,
the Secretary for Transport, D.A.C. Nendick, the
Secretary for Monetary Affairs, and G. Barnes, the
Secretary for Lands and Works-17 The Board is given
wide-ranging powers including setting the fares,
borrowing or raising money and creating and issuing
bonds, notes or other securities under Government's
guarantees if it sees fit. The Governor-in-Council may
however, if he considers the public interests so
requires, gives directions in writing of a general
character to the Corporation. The auditor is appointed
by the Governor after consultation with the
Corporation and all books of account, within three
months of the receipt by it of the auditor's report be
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furnished to the Financial Secretary who tables same in
the Legislative Council.18 As such, it is noteworthy
that the design is to make the Corporation operated
like a private commercial enterprise with the least
interferences in all respects.
By 1987 the MTRC, with a staff force of 4,525, has
captured 23 per cent of the territory-wide public
transport market and on the key cross-harbour route,
the railway was the dominant carrier with a share of 52
per cent. The average number of week-day passengers
reached 1.8 million at the end of 1987.19 In the eight
years (1980-87) since the first full year of railway
operation, its operating profit margins are kept in the
region of 38-57 per cent. The Corporation takes pride
to state that it is the only underground mass transit
railway in the world which earns unsubsidised fare
revenue sufficient to cover all costs, including
depreciation, plus a useful operating profit margin."20
The construction of the MTR, appreciably the largest
public work project Hong Kong ever had, was extremely
costly. The total debt incurred as at 31 December,
1987, still amounted to $18.2 billion.21 To seek for an
active financing programme and to refine the structure
of its debt profile remain the most formidable task of
the Cororation, mindful of that its ability to use
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commercial loans to supplement Government own equity
and loan injections,22 to use Sankey's words, is one of
the main reason for its incorporation. To secure good
credit ratings, financial presentations or Road
Shows, as it is called, are undertaken every now and
then in major world's financial centres. The
Corporation also fine-tunes its preferred debt profile
annually by procuring new financial instruments.23
Given the huge figure of borrowings, interest and
finance charges, amounting to $1.4 billion in 1987
alone,24 payable to the bonds and commercial papers
issued and loans raised in the local and international
capital markets, often exceed the operating profits,
notwithstanding the fare hikes made each year. In 1986
and 1987, an extra profit of $482 million and $720
million respectively, has been derived from property
development along its railway lines-25 But this revenue
will be cut off after 1989 when all the MTR real estate
ventures have been completed and sold. Wilfrid Newton,
Chairman and Managing Director of the MTR, has promised
in 1985 that all indebtedness would be paid off by the
end of the century.26 It seems there is little
likelihood for doing this in view of the above, unless
the Government would commit to more injections of funds
and fares be increased indefinitely which would however
invite criticism from the public.
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Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC)
The KCRC was formed in December, 1982 by hiving-off a
Government agency, i.e., the Kowloon-Canton Railway
Department, the first of its kind, to an independent
body outside the civil service. The change of status
was in large part engendered by the modernisation and
electrification of the entire railway line completed
in same year which calls for an administrative
structure operating on commercial principles to cope
with the expanded volume of passenger and freight
traffic and to fulfil a better financing and management
as the former Department had perennially suffered from
straight losses for many years.27
Discharging similar activities as the MTR, the KCRC
Ordinance 1982 has set out same provisions as to its
administrative and financial relationship with
Government and the powers and managerial freedoms it
enjoys (see above). The KCRC is wholly owned by the
Government whom upon the incorporation, had transferred
to it current and fixed assets worth $2.5 billion, $1
billion being cash loan due to pay back, as initial
capitals, and reimbursed previous employees of the
Department a total of $70 million for compensations.28
The Corporation has seemed to sustain d yuuu uuJ1•
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track record in the past five years (1984-88) of
operation. By 1988 the KCR carried about 470,000
passengers daily, more than ten times of that before
corporatisation.29 Except for the first year which
had experienced a loss of $65 million, profits after
interest and depreciation charges were registered for
the rest of the years.30 In 1988 this amounts to $562
million-- half of it being incomes from property
development, a one-fold increase in comparison with the
previous year and the Government loan had also been
repaid.31 In 1986 the KCRC shouldered the construction
and development of the Light Rail Transit (LRT) linking
Yuen Long and Tuen Mun in the northwest part of the New
Territories. Credit also goes to productivity which has
been rising every year and a source of pride to Peter
Quick, the Managing Director, that despite the
tremendous growth of business turnovers, the number of
employees has sheerly increased from 2011 to 2845 over
the period.32 The Goverment also echoed the favourable
comment on the KCRC as John Bremridge, the former
Financial Secretary, puts it in 1986 at a session of
the Legislative Council, [I] do not believe that the
KCR could have done so well under its former structure.
operating in a competitive environment, the railway
must be run in accordance with commercial principles.
As a statutory corporation, the KCRC has been able to
respond quickly to market conditons and enjoys far
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greater flexibility than any Government department in
making commercial decisions, in marketing its services
and in planning and implementing its future
developmenti33 Given the sound financial background and
high rate of returns, there are talks within and
without the Government of a complete privatisation
of the KCRC by listing it on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange,34 notwithstanding the public concerns on its
profiteering orientation and the lack of control.
The Issues of Control
For all the progress attained by the MTRC and KURL
since their operation, they alike face the problem of
control, which is universal for that species of
organisation-- public corporations, particularly those
revenue-yielding ones. As Nicholas Henry remarks,
Public authorities, although chartered by governments,
are rarely controlled by them.ii35 Given the very nature
of the political system of Hong Kong which is
executive-centred, the Governor, at least in theory, as
can be noted from the statutory provisions, is the
supreme head of the two Corporations. He maintains the
power of appointing all Board members (as opposed to
the ministerial appointment in Britain) being held
responsible to him and may obtain any information from
the Corporation he so requests (Section 19, MTRC
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Ordinance). At the same time, his power is somewhat
curbed as it has been specified that he may -give
directions to the Corporation only for those of a
general character and complying with the public
interest. And if the direction contravenes prudent
commercial principles, the Government must compensate
the Corporation in full (S.20, MTRC Ordinance and S.6,
KCRC Ordinance). This arrangement obviously is to
foster independence of the Corporation from undue
interferences. In fact same provisions are usually
found in the British public corporations, because the
rule of thumb is there should be some ministerial
control and some public accountability-- but not too
much.36
As a practice, the Secretary for Transport and
Secretary for Monetary Affairs will be appointed to the
Board, though the law has not provided for that they
are ex-officio members. They are intended to be the
representatives of the Government who may be directly
informed of all matters relating-with the Corporation
and exercise supervision. But by statute they are no
more than a director who must comply with the
managerial decisions of'the Board. Such a confusion of
roles has been a source of critics as shown in the
golden handshake affair. In early 1989, two senior
staff of the KCRC were, by a decision of the Board,
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granted an ex gratia payment totalling almost $4
million as leave compensations-37 The information was
leaked to the media and caused a furious public outcry.
People questioned the ability of the two Government
officials attending the Board in overseeing corporate
behaviours out of an overlapping role. They were asked
to pull out and replace their supervision by more
effective measures of sanction.38
In comparision with Government control, the supervision
from the legislature is even less sanguine,
particularly in the Hong Kong context. As Henry again
observes it, Although the statute that establish
public authorities can be and frequently are, very
specific and detailed, once the authority is
established, legislative control often becomes a
mockery.1139 In Western democracies, the executive
branch is held answerable to the legislature a
ministerial control may automatically mean a supervison
on the part of the legislature which may enquire into
and censure any matter concerning the executive
authorities. In Hong Kong the Legislative Council has
not been entrusted with any formal function except for
the reading of books of account tabled before it by
statute (S.16 (4), MTRC Ordinance and S.14 (5), KCRC
Ordinance) in monitoring the two railway utilities. It
goes without saying that the Legislative Councillors
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might well exert an informal influence by moving
motions to put the matters of the Corporations to' the
forum for discussion, but they have no real power
whatsoever to alter their decisions.40
On the other hand, the Corporations have seemed to be
granted too much financial autonomy as in the most
important provision on fee charging, they are empowered
to determine fares payable by persons travelling on
the railway (S.6(2), MTRC Ordinance and S.9(2), KCRC
Ordinance). So the Board is actually free to decide the
fare structure, needing only to inform the Executive
Council as a courtesy beforehand. In contrast utilities
operated by private companies under franchises (see
Chapter IV) have to abide by the Scheme of Control and
to obtain the approval from the Transport Advisory
Committee in each fare adjustment. The abuse of that
power lies at the heart of the public concerns in
regard to the two utility Corporations. The levy of a
surcharge by the MTRC in May 1988, not to make up the
rising cost, but to discourage peak-hour travel at some
of its busiest stations along the Nathan Road corridor,
is testimony to the breadth of the problem-41
On financial matters, the Government is perhaps more
concerned for a balanced account, i.e., its revenue is
at least sufficient to meet its expenditure (S.13(1),
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MTRC Ordinance). There is thus much ground for
complacency for the KCRC in particular, when both of
the two Corporations have reaped satisfactory profits-
at a steady pace. Ironically this high yield of returr
will not enhance accountability according to public
opinion. With the Government loan repaid and the
surplus accumulated directed to its own reserve fund,
the KCRC has now virtually become financially
independent. Unlike the non-revenue-yielding public
corporations (see below) which the Government could
definitely play the upper hand through appropriations,
there is a danger of running out of control in respect
of the KCRC and MTRC, considering their least reliance
on the public budget.42 This worry, plus the defects
given above, have allegedly prompted Government to
ponder better ways of supervision. One measure proposed
by Government is to re-define its relationship with the
public corporation in a Memorandum of Agreement with
the power of sanction signed between them.43
Another alternative is the inclusion of public control
which is however quite out of the question to the
Government but has been fervently sought for by a host
of pressure groups and civic bodies.44 The crux of
their proposal is to increase the representativeness of
the Board membership by inducing to it elective
elements recruited from the District Boards, the Urban
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and Regional Councils, the Legislative Council and
various sectors of the community-45 Foreign experiencE
as to the control of public corporations has so fax
been inconclusive. As Annmarie Hauk Walsh puts it, ThE
successes of public authorities have, in fact,
motivated much of the criticism of them. Critics on the
left seek a more purposeful, dynamic, and
democratically controlled public sector. Those on the
right seek to reduce the scope of government
enterprise, or at least check its growth, and to limit
its activities to those that aid private
endeavours,.... .public authorities have withstood such
assults practically unscathed and continue to clain
rights of independent management.46
Housing Authority
The Reorganisation New Financial Arrangement
Public housing including the Home Ownership Scheme
flats has accomodated 45 per cent of the total
population in Hong Kong.47 This was largely
accomplished by a heavy commitment and active
intervention on the part of Government in the provision
of low cost housing. In 1987 Government's puplic
housing programme has taken up one third of its annual
expenditure on capital works.48 The policy was changed
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with the recent reorganisation of the Housing
Authority.
The Housing Authority was established in 1954, at first
to provide limited quantities of estate housing under
Government loan along with other Government department.
To implement the ten-year housing programme initiated
by Sir Murray Maclechose, it was reorganised in 1973,
which became a policy-making body chaired by the
Secretary for Housing in charge of the public rental
housing (PRH) in collaboration with the Housing
Department, its executive arm-49 In 1988 the Authority
was for the second time reorganised to facilitate a new
policy on housing.
Central to the change was the dissolution of the
Housing Branch with its duties hived-off to the Housing
Authority which subsequently became the sole and
independent body overseeing the policy formulation of
all public housing affairs. The post of the Secretary
for Housing was cancelled and the Chairman which was
reserved to him, of the Authority was replaced by a
non-Government person. Moreover the number of official
members in the Authority was reduced from six to
three-50 Together with the reshuffle was the putting in
place of a new financial arrangement of Government with
the Authority. A total of $17 billion in form of
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current and fixed assets, $13.26 billion being the sum
borrowed so far from the Development Loan Fund' and
$3.78 billion the balance left in the Home Ownership
Fund, was transferred to the Housing Authority as its
permanent capital.51 The reorganisation therefore
followed the model of corporatisation along the line of
the KCRC, only that the Housing Department was still
maintained a Government agency, serving as an executive
arm for the Housing Authority as before. And the
Director of Housing became its Chief Executive. The new
financial arrangement also encompasses following
details:52
(i) A total of $10 billion will be injected
between 1989 and 1994 to facilitate the
Authority's cash flow making the total
permanent capital contributed by Government to
$27 billion
(ii) An interest at a rate of 5 per cent per annum
is levied on the capital contributed
(iii) Income from commercial undertakings (estate's
shopping malls and carparks, etc.) will be
split between Government and the Authority
and
(iv) Surplus exceeding a maximum limit will be
directed to the public coffer.
A decreasing role of Government in the housing
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provisions is evident in this new financial
arrangement. The emphasis on return has signalled a
change that public housing is no longer a product of
altruism catered to social needs but a kind of
investment subject to the supply and demand curve.53
The Government has computed that by 2001, the interest
and profits charged by it will amount to $31.6 billion,
i.e., a return of $4.6 billion. To be sure, it has
denied making such a profit as in addition, a free land
grant totally worth $20 billion will have been
contributed in the same period.54 The reorganisation
and new financial arrangement, as conceded by
Government, was to cope with the implementation of the
Long Term Housing Strategy announced in April, 1987.
Commentators have pointed out that the new financial
arrangement also serves the purpose of dampening the
public pressure against rent rises and the demand for
building more public housing, when surplus is envisaged
in the Housing Authority by the middle of the 1990s as
projected by the Long Term Housing Strategy-55
Long Term Housing Strategy
Among other things, the Long Term Housing Strategy, as
a policy statement of Government, has manifested some
of the tenets of privatisation. As it states, In the
1950s, 60s and early 70s, the greatest need was for low
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rental housing and production was concentrated on
public rental housing projects. Improved economic
conditions in Hong Kong have brought with them
expectations and there is a demand for improvements in
living conditions, including a growing aspiration to
own rather to rent.i56 It envisages a need for a change
in direction in the housing policy based on a review of
the housing demand and supply and the future population
trend, which shows that by 1995 there is likey to be an
over-provision of public rental housing, an under-
provision of Home Ownership Scheme (HOS)/Private Sector
Participation Scheme (PSPS) flats and a under-
utilisation of the private sector's resources.57 By
accentuating affordability or the ability to pay, the
policy statement suggests, It is desirable to
introduce measures that will attract more of the
better-off tenants of the PRH to move to other
accomodation which they can now afford.58 The measures
are: to encourage assisted home purchase by providing
more HOS/PSPS flats and unassisted home purchase in
the private sector by introducing a Home Purchase Loan
Scheme (HPLS).59 By shifting the bases of public
housing programme from rental to purchase,60 the Long
Term Housing Strategy has laid out a private-centred
housing policy with due recognition of market criteria,
signifying a retreat of public responsibility. As a
T.ecsislative Councillor comments it, The responsibility
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for improving living conditions is now gradually beinc
shouldered by those who stand to benefit, and indeed,
by the private sector. So the limited resources of
Government can be channelled into meeting the basic
needs of the low income groups. This is...in line with
the general principles of free enterprise in Hong
Kong.i61 The sale of HOS/PSPS flats could make a quick
recovery of cost and a considerable profit return,
comparing with the PRH. That explains the forecast
surplus in the Housing Authority by 1995 when HOS/PSPS
flats will account for three quarters of the total
supply of public housing per annum-62
In the PRH sector, in 1986, a new rental policy of that
the rental rate should be equal to 15 per cent of the
average family income of a household and better-off
tenants charged twice the rent at the expiry of the
initial ten years of residence, has been put into
practice.63 The policy also has seemed to justify rent
rises by emphasising user charges, the ability to pay
and cost-effectiveness, which in effect would turn the
provision of low cost housing to the needy into a
residual social service-64 And this tendency for
commercialisation and commodification, the tenets
cherished by advocates of privatisation, will be
carried over to the new Housing Authority with added
imInn tc Tn other words, the new Housing Authority,
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taking the form of a public corporation, with financial
and managerial independence, serves an excellent
vehicle for the implementation of a privatised housing
policy. This same organisational nexus applies to the
proposed Hospital Authority.
Hospital Authority
In 1985 the Government had commissioned an Australian
consultancy firm, W.D. Scott Co., to study the
delivery of medical services in hospitals in Hong Kong.
The outcome was a Report published a year later which
underlies the formation of the Hospital Authority
scheduled in April, 1990 by Government in accordance
with its recommendation. The Report has mapped out a
new medical policy which is going to have far-reaching
effects on the development of hospital care in Hong
Kong. It stressed from the outset that the aim of its
study was to derive a solution for medical problems in
Hong Kong based on a maximisation of outputs against
limited resources: At a time when the cost of
providing medical service is rising faster than most
other public services, Hong Kong is faced with
indications of reduced growth rates in overall
Government revenue, yet has a growing community
expectation for improved medical and hospital
care.....In the longer term there are concerns about
56
the level of future Government funding, the overall
effectiveness of the use of resources, and the general
management situation in the larger hospitals.i65 The
critical need therefore is to harness all available
scarce resources and focus them on the provision and
further development of medical services in
hospitals.i66 The organisational framework that could
preferably achieve these goals is an independent
authority structure outside the civil service.67
Together with the suggested set-up of the new
structure, which would mean a hiving-off of hospital
activities from the Medical and Health Department and
an ultimate change of status of its 25,000 civil
service staff, the Report also drew up a detailed
reform programme for the betterment of medical services
in hospitals. Foremost among the suggestions are the
integration of the subvented and Government hospitals
(cf. above) and the introduction of an array of cost
control measures, besides those on internal hospital
structure, regional management, working environment and
tackling overcrowding. Three aspects of cost control,
the Report points out, require attention, namely,
resource allocation, control of expenditure against a
planned budget and maximising value for money spent.68
The recommendations in respect of cost recovery and
control embrace the followings:69
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1. The basic charge for third class bed is tied to a
fixed percentage of the average bed day costs,
rather than to the cost of the food.
2. There will be a charge for attendence at Accident
and Emergency Department equivalent to the cost
of attending a specialist clinic, to prevent
abuses of these services.
3. An admission charge is introduced, equal to a
single bed day charge, as recognition of the
additional costs incurred in the admission
process.
4. A major facility usage charge is introduced for
the use of such facilities, to recognise the
increased cost of provision of this type of
service.
5. To introduce more higher class accomodation,
i.e., the second or B class beds, which on
examining socio-economic data appear to have a
demand between 2,000 to 4,000 beds.
It is no doubt that these measures of marketisation,
once implemented, would totally change the distributive
justice inherent in socialised medicine by collective
provisions. Like those of the housing sector, patients
will become consumers, and the supply of a medical good
or service will be determined by one's ability to pay,
but not need.70 To the social work practitioners, this
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is a breach of the concept of public health which is a
kind of social wealth that the Government has a
responsibility to maintain and will jeopardise social
equity by widening the gap between the poor and the
better-off.71 But to the Australian consultants, a
privatised medical policy represents the rational
tendency of a quasi-capitalist enterprise in resource
allocation and cost reduction.
Thus far, it can be seen that in the revenue yielding
public corporations dewlt on above, they all exhibit a
tendency toward adopting commerical principles or
marketisation so-called in their management and
operation. And the financial independence they would
attain, albeit in various degrees, will render
supervisions from the outside less effective. By sharp
contrast, the non-revenue-yielding public corporations
are operated on completely different principles, to
.,Hr +-ro fnllnwina section will turn.
Non-Revenue-Yielding Public Corporations
The non-revenue-yielding public corporations are Liit--
Trade Development Council, Tourist Association and
Consumer Council. The services they render, trade and
tourist promotions and consumer protection, are those
of the pure public or collective services (see Chapter
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I), which are free of charge and used simultaneously by
many people that no one can be excluded. Hence,* far
from being profit-making, just on the opposite, these
corporations are to provide some necessary and
essential services on behalf of the Government to
society at large at its own cost. There is no question
of financial independence in them as they all wholly
rely on public funds for financing. To facilitate
appropriations by the Finance Committee of the
Legislative Council, it has been specified in their
respective ordinance that each year, before a date to
be appointed by the Financial Secretary, they must
forward to him, for the approval of the Governor, a
programme of its proposed activities for the next
financial year incorporating estimates of its income
and expenditure for the same year. In addition, within
six months after the end of each financial year, they
are required to produce to the Governor a report on
their activities attached therewith their books of
account which are then laid on the table of the
Legislative Council. These provisions which can
guarantee to the Government a full control,72 are
usually not present in their revenue-yielding
an amount of $200 million was
counterparts. In 1988*
appropriated to the Trade Development Council, $20
million to the Tourist Association, and $10 million to
the Consumer Council.73 At any rate, as privatised
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structures, these corporations have made a tremendous
contribution in boosting Hong Kong's international
trade and tourism and enhancing consumer protection
with an innovative spirit that can hardly be surpassed
by an ordinary government agency.
Summary
Two types of public corporations can be discerned in
Hong Kong, namely, the revenue-yielding and non-
revenue-yielding varieties. In public corporations, the
government, as the sole share-holder, is the owner, and
the management of which is delegated to a separate body
outside the public sector. Privatisation is chiefly
envisaged at the level of management. In the Hong Kong
model, members of this managerial body are all
appointed by the Governor as opposed to the ministerial
appointment in other democratic countries. In the
latter, the three levels of control, namely,
government, legislative, and public controls are
integrated into an organic whole because ministers are
answerable to the legislature elected by the people. In
Hong Kong, given the nature of the political system, at
a formal level, legislative control is almost non-
existent-- effective only when the corporation needs
appropriations, much less public control. The
supervision rests with the Governor through appointing
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a few official members to the managing board to keep
abreast of matters concerning the corporation. It is
true that the control of public corporations is equally
a problem as far as foreign experience is concerned,
for it is difficult to interfere into the corporate
affairs under the name of managerial independence and
professionalism. But the dearth of democratic control
in the case of Hong Kong has created a new dimension of
the problem and not surprisingly, public disputes with
the public corporations become the order of the day. To
include members elected from among the interest groups,
a kind of corporatist arrangement,74 to increase the
representativeness of the board, certainly can help
alleviate the problem, but that may induce political
influences, to the detriment of managerial efficiency,
the most important virtue of public corporations. After
all, public participation has been enhanced by opening
a new avenue for administrative absorption,75 besides
the advisory committees, through appointing unofficial
board members selected from the community. It seems the
ultimate solution still counts on the democratisation
of the political system.
But the problems of control given above do not apply tc
the non-revenue-yielding public corporations, sheerly
because they do not have their own source of incomE
except from the Government to whom they must show their
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deference.
By hiving-off governmental activities to a quasi-
private party with a membership appointed by
Government, the public corporation is in essence a de-
politicised structure which can act as an
administrative buffer to shield Government officials
from political pressure-76 It has been speculated every
now and then that the Government's motive for
corporatisation, which gathered momentum in recent
years, has been, among others, to serve a two-fold
purpose, to reduce the political pressure it faces in
the transitional period and to curtail the
administrative power of the future SAR government.77 Be
that as it may, corporatisation, as a category of
privatisation, is an extension of the traditional non-
interventionist approach of the Hong Kong Government in
the implementation of public policy. And the change of
the mode of organisation, from a government department
to a corporation, or the creation of the latter, is to
facilitate an adoption of the management style of
private enterprises including a marketised form of




SUBSIDIES, VOUCHER ARRANGEMENTS, AN
CONTRACTING
PURCHASE OF SERVICE
This chapter will examine another alternative for the
privatisation of Governmental functions and activities,
which can be subsumed under the heading, purchase of
service. That is, instead of direct or in-house
provisions, the Government buys the services it has to
supply from the private sector, both non-profit or for-
profit bodies. In this connection, three types of
institutional arrangements can be discerned, namely,
subsidies, voucher arrangements, and contracting. Each
of these will-be dealt with in detail in the sections
which follow.
SUBSIDIES AND VOUCHER ARRANGEMENTS
In subsidies, government puts in the money the private
party, naturally a voluntary agency in general, i.e., a
non-profit-making organisation, runs the business for
the benefit of a third party: their clients. As John F.
Jones puts it, subsidies are direct payments by a
government agency to a voluntary organisation as a
rn mhrc--Pment for care or service given to an
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individual for whom there is a public responsibility.1
When a government funds voluntary services, it is
usually in the belief that a voluntary agency can
provide the service more appropriately (an ideological
value), more efficiently (an economic consideration)
and more effectively (a practical judgement). 2 In Hong
Kong, over time the subvented sector which thrives on
Government funds has been extended to cover most of the
social welfare, education and medical and health
services.
Voucher is also a kind of government assistance by cash
payment. But unlike subsidies that fund the producer
and restrict the consumer's choice to the subsidised
producers only (if he wishes to avail himself of the
subsidy), the voucher system subsidies the consumer
direct and permits the latter to exercise relatively
free choice in the marketplace to pick up a private
producer. The government issues vouchers representing a
certain monetary value each to eligible consumers to
pay for a prescribed service or good supplied by the
mnr1ot 3
It is palpable that the greatest advantage of the
voucher approach is its ability to foster consumers'
choice on the part of the voucher recipients and
competitions on the part of the producers-4 Voucher
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programmes, in a variety of forms, are best known in
the United States. These include food stamp,
Medicaid (medicare enrollment card), rent voucher,
transportation voucher, cultural voucher and education
voucher.5 The School Medical Service Scheme and the
proposed Direct Subsidy Scheme are local examples of
subsidies operated on voucher mechanism.
Social Welfare
Public-Private Partnerships
Social welfare in Hong Kong was started as a sort of
charity provided by private benevolent groups,
missionaries, international welfare organisations
relied heavily on overseas donations.6 Philantropic
organisations like the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals and
the Po Leung Kuk have already given more than a century
service to the people. The influx of immigrants from
Chinese mainland in the 50s and 60s triggered
tremendous demands for welfare services. In 1958 the
Social Welfare Department was formed to cope with this
situation.? At the same time, economic growth since the
post-war age was impressive public revenue grew by
leaps and bounds. The Government gradually replaced the
private sector to take up the burden of social welfare.
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At this juncture, the role of the voluntary agencies
(VAs) has to be defined. The principle of partnership
in the provision of welfare services was thereby
officially recognised in the 1965 White Paper, the
first policy document issued by Government on social
welfare, entitled The Aims and Policy of Social
Welfare.8 It suggests, The Hong Kong Government
should support and cooperate with voluntary
organisations in a programme directed to the
coordination of available resources, and to planning
for the future improvement and necessary extension of
voluntary welfare services.119 The White Paper thus gave
due recognition to VAs as the pioneers of social
service in Hong Kong, but noted the tendency of
Government to assume ever widening responsibility in
the welfare field, leaving to VAs the task of
complementing statutory services and undertooking work
which is outside the scope of statutory provision.10
In the section entitled The Role of Voluntary
Organisations, the criteria for determining the
appropriate sphere for voluntary effort were stated as
follows: 11
(a) where specific services are provided for special
groups, e.g., the deaf, the aged
(b) where special resources not available to
Government may be used, e.g., overseas funds,
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proceeas or local appeals, support from a
charitable trust or foundation, volunteer staff
(c) where voluntary agencies can effectively perform
needed services at less cost than Government
and
(d) where the service provided is desirable but not
of high priority, and could if necessary be
reduced or eliminated during a period of
economic recession.
The White Paper also recognised the ideological reasons
for supporting voluntarism and the practical
implications of such a policy. Voluntary effort is an
essential element in a free community, if its citizens
are to develop and manitain a sense of responsibility
for the well-being of others. Such effort also serves
as a means of channelling the charitable impluses of
people in socially desirable directions and taps
financial resources not otherwise available, thus
relieving to a marked degree the burden falling upon
public funds.12
The White Paper of 1973 on social welfare was again
very explicit on the role of the public and private
sectors. By that time, overseas support for the
voluntary agencies had decreased in importance
Government had become the principal source of funding
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and Government had expanded its social welfare to
include social security.13 This White Paper states,
The Government has the ultimate responsibility for
ensuring that Hong Kong has satisfactory social welfare
services available to everyone irrespective of race or
creed.i14 And this responsibility could be discharged
by Government in five ways:15
1. By maintaining peace, order and good government,
the prerequisites of social welfare
2. By continuing to provide the majority of the
funds available for social welfare in Hong Kong
3. By offering certain direct social welfare
services and also supporting services, e.g.
training facilities for other agencies
4. By carrying out its statutory obligations which
it alone can fulfil and
5. By having other departments, besides the Social
Welfare Department, involved in the provision of
services.
On the part of the voluntary sector, the wnite raper
anticipates public-private cooperation as it writes,
[E]xperience has shown that if there is a vigorous
voluntary sector, with agencies specialising in
different areas, then the Government can make fruitful
use of these agencies' services so that together the
Government and the voluntary agencies share in the
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extension of service. i 16
The document provides three main reasons, among others,
why it was important to maintain the strength of the
voluntary contribution: 17
1. Voluntary social services can provide a basis of
comparison with Government services, and perhaps
stimulate improvement
2. Voluntary agencies can be more experimental in
pioneering new programmes or in raising
standards of existing services
3. Non-government agencies have been traditionally
successful in harnessing the volunteer spirit
and utilising volunteers
The 1979 White Paper entitled Social Welfare into the
1980s reiterated the role of the voluntary welfare
asserted in 1973: In Hong Kong's circumstances, there
remains an important role for a vigorous, progressive
and responsible voluntary sector, working in mutual
understanding and close cooperation with the
Government.i18 It clearly delineates the Government's
fuctions in welfare provision into three-fold: 1. to
direct and coordinate the development of social welfare
services including overseeing and monitoring the
implementation of services according to set priorities
2. to provide an adequate social security system and
70
certain social welfare services direct, particularly
those required by law and 3. to ensure that funds are
available for the social selfare services which the
community needs.19
Statutory services are those tasks charged with the
Social Welfare Department (SWD) in the field o:
probation and corrections, adoptions and the care anc
protection of women and children. These functions it
most places cannot be farmed out to VAs. Other welfarE
services run by SWD concentrate on family services,
group and community work and rehabilitation.20 But the
division of labour tends to tilt much toward the VAE
which numbering more than 450 by now, have beer
estimated to have provided two thirds of all social
welfare services in Hong Kong.21 Thus services for the
elderly, youth and children centres and child day car
Programmes like youth centres, out-reaching social
work, school social work, Minibus Scheme for the
disabled, protection of children against abuse and
community development, among many others, were first
initiated by VAs, reflective of their pioneering role
in welfare provisions.23
services are solely operated by the voluntary sector. 22
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Subvention Policies
In line with the policy set in the White Paper of 1965
and 1973, the Government started financing VAs by
providing subventions which have increased by about 300
per cent from $25.2 million in 1973/74 to $100 million
in 1978/79, and continuously rose in the 1980s at a
rate of 23.2 per cent on average. By 1987/88, the
allocation amounted to $619 million, representing yet
another three-fold increase over the 1980/81's $146
million (see Table 3.1). A breakown of subventions by
rogramme is given at Table 3.2.
Table 3.1 Government Subventions to VAs-on
Social Welfare Services.
















Source: D-epartmental Report, Director of Social we-Liar(,
1981-88.
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Table 3.2 Government Subventions to VAs on Social Welfare Services




48,559,036.O0 48,539,123.7142,197,832.25Young People 39,683,891.25 59,310,740.O0
Family Welfare 68,510,348.80 80,638.179.35 95,894,865.14 104,302,245.65 128,587,831.00
Offenders 6,675,215.00 7,251,548.00 8,120,504.50 8,178,257.01 9,328,267.00
Elderly 44,637,674.2034,424,834.38 60,946,980.78 79,319,226.39 96.885.181.00
Rehabilitation 48,323,272.20 58,325,328.70 70,251,565.18 81,487,776.70 112,557,773.00
Social Security 57,918.20 72,185.78 76,719.00 72,373.55 118052.00
Social Welfare Support 27,294,611.55* 30,271,297.25* 32,294,020.50* 34,096,386.12 38,121,438.00
Rates 4,219,319.24 4, 951.236.91 6,658,010.68 8,060,491.70 7,353,901.00
Total 321,803,230.12 374,592,792.14 448,465,831.03 504,371,363.43 619,519,976.00
* including rent subsidy for non-subvented agencies and replacement grant
Source: Departmental Report, Director of Social Welfare, 1988.
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At present, up to 70 per cent of all VAs have their
income solely depending on Government subventions with
the virtually complete withdrawal of overseas
assistance.24 In 1986/87 subventions for recurrent
expenditure amounting to $567.4 million were alloted to
152 major welfare agencies-25 The Lotteries Fund which
finances capital expenditure in the same year has
contributed an amount of $123.8 million allocated to
220 agencies.26 To be sure, VAs also rely on the
Community chest, the Jockey Club and private donations
and charitable trust funds, although only a fraction
comparing with Government funding, to sustain their
activities-27
The current subvention system was devised in 1982,
following a report by the Working Party on Provision of
Social Welfare Services and Subvention Administration,
completed in June, 1980, which provide for all social
welfare services to be classified into two categories
for funding purposes.28 Services in Category I receive
a subvention designed to meet the full cost of a
specified standard of service, adjusted for price
increases and disregarding all income other than
recognised fees. Services belonging to this category
must be those that are required by law that are to
satisfy the basic needs of human beings and that can
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come as contingent measures to mitigate an acute social
problem. More than 80 per cent of the voluntary welfare
have been classified as Category I services and
received 100 per cent assistance. These include old
people's homes, nursing centres and sheltered work for
the disabled, etc.29
Category II services usually receive less than 100 per
cent support based either on a fixed percentage of the
standard cost, which will apply to all agencies
providing that service, or on a lump sum basis if
standard costs cannot be determined, also adjusted for
price increases and disregarding individual income
other than recognised fees.30 Agencies providing
services under the standard cost scheme have allegedly
been given maximum flexibility in resources deployment
as the level of subvention is not arrived at
arbitrarily like that of the old discretionary system,
easing them from financial uncertainty.31 None the
less, this scheme currently applies to only eight types
of services, namely, small group homes, neigbourhood
level community development projects, school social
work, foster care service, family life education, pool
bus service for the elderly, family casework service
and outreaching social work.32 There is a strong urge
in the social work circle for an extension of the
standard cost part to other services to the eventual
75
phasing out of the lump sum grant which is
discretionary in nature.33
When calculating the standard cost, the Government's
practice is to exercise parity of personal emolument,
basic salary, between employees of Government and staff
of VAs in as far as working conditions are concerned,
though ratio of senior posts is much smaller in the
latter. In respect of fringe benefits, agency staff are
deprived in many ways including the absence of housing
allowance or staff quarters (very often only applies to
retirement pensions and fully paid maternity leave and
educational allowance for employee's children are noted
by their non-existence-34 It is no doubt that the
subvented welfare sector could deliver services cheaper
and more cost-effective than its civil service
counterparts. After all subventions to VAs account for
only 20 per cent of Hong Kong's total welfare
expenditure, yet they provide over 70 per cent of all
welfare services, indicating their great
resourcefulness.35
Monitoring
Without exaggeration, given the heavy share of VAs in
welfare provisions, most of the work of SWD are
the chief executive) inferior medical covers and
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concerned with the monitoring of services and
allocation of funds it is primarily a service
arranger, not a service producer. To maintain a proper
and the best use of public funds, allocations to
agencies are made through a onerous procedure set by
SWD. First, each organisation applies for subvention to
the Director of Social Welfare with the necessary
documentation to justify its claim the Department vets
the application, and if necessary, revises it,
generally after consultation with the agency concerned.
The revised application with the Director's comments
and recommendations is then put to the Subvention and
Lotteries Fund Advisory Committee (or the Social
Welfare Advisory Committee previously) which in turn
makes its recommendations to the Finance Branch of the
Government's Secretariat and, after discussion, an
agreed sum is entered into the draft estimates in the
name of the particular voluntary agency-36
SWD also has the responsibility to ensure that public
funds allocated are used for their intended purpose. In
1979, the regionalisation of SWD came into effect
resulting in the creation of four branches at the
headquarters level and eleven districts grouped under
four regions at the operational level.37 This change in
structure is to facilitate two main objectives-- the
strengthening of local district coordination and the
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delegation of evaluation of VAS to the district
officers instead of the central Subvention Branth.38
Local staff keep close contacts with the subvented
units through regular visits to make sure that
subvention is properly assessed and spent and also to
identify areas where agencies need help, be it
technical or financial, to improve and expand service.
Internally, the Evaluation Section of the Department
provides advice and guidelines to district officers on
matter relating to the monitoring of subvented
activities. A Statistcal Information System has been
maintained to collect management and service
information from subvented agencies on a regular basis
for the purpose of evaluating agency performance.39
The Hong Kong Council of Social Service, formed in 1951
as a central body for the planning and coordination of
VAs, also plays a prominent role in overseeing the
service standard of its more than 110 member
agencies-40 There is no particular law to lay down
rules and regulations for VAs. Depending on the way of
formation, they will be bound by the Companies
Ordinance or Societies Ordinance. Some of the major
agencies, about 12 to 15 of them, are however statutory
organisations. They are incorporated by statute and
controlled by individual ordinance. Agencies on this
list include the Caritas, Hong Kong Society for the
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Blind, Hong Kong Society for the Protection of
Children, the Salvation Army, Young Men's Christian
Association, Society for the Relief of Disabled
Children, the Red Cross and also the Tung Wah Group of
Hospitals and the Po Leung Kuk, the last two of which
will be dwelt on below.41 Overall, it seems, with rooms
for improvement, the enterprising spirit and the
quality sustained by the voluntary welfare have proven
the effectiveness of monitoring.
Education42
By looking at the percentage distribution in 1981-82 of
education subventions in the education expenditure (see
Table 3.3) which stands at 61.3 per cent, it can be
seen that the Education Department (ED) is very much a
service arranger reminiscent of the Social Welfare
Department rather than a producer, whose expenditure
only accounts for 14.2 per cent of the total. In the
secondary sector, ED only operates 36 schools, but
aided schools run by private voluntary bodies and
financed by Government subventions have reached a
number of 300 in 1988.43 Between 1980-84, only 6-8 per
cent of the Forms I- III places and 10-14 per cent of
the Forms IV- V places were directly provided by
Government the rest of them were either aided places
4r) nor rAnt And A ner_ cent respectively) or bought
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452.9 489.6282.1255.8226.4200.1 315.4Education Department 188.7
L161.9 1462.1 1965.3 2106.6843.2685.0Education Subventions 982.4721.3
Universities and 810.3 840.6414.3296.4 547.5225.0 332.2310.2
Polytechnic.
1858.3 2325.0 3228.51098.7 1231.6 1366.0 1570.4Total I3436.0
(15.0) (18.3) (25.1) (38.9) (6.5)'(13.9) (12.1) (1o.9)(Annual% increase)
Estimation.
Source: The Hong Kong Education System, A Green Paper,
Education Department, June 1981, p. 75.
places (see below).44 Indeea same as su icy WC11Q1G,
educational work (primary and secondary) were largely
undertaken by private endeavours in the early history
of Hong Kong.45 Beginning in the 1970s, especially
after the introduction of the nine-year universal, free
and compulsory education in 1978, the Government
drastically increased spendings on education. Many of
the private schools were, through a scheme of
conversion, turned to aided status.46
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Codes of Aid
The Codes of Aid under which voluntary effort in
education receives Government supports, strictly
speaking, are not categories of subvention but rather
an administrative device to allow the Government
encourage and direct non-Government initiatives.47
There are four separate codes prescribing the rules and
conditions governing financial grants to schools in the
aided sector. These are:48
(i) the Code of Aid for Primary Schools
(ii) the Code of Aid for Secondary Schools
(iii) the Code of Aid for Special Primary Schools and
Special Classes in Primary Schools and
(iv) the Code of Aid for Special Secondary Schools
and Special Classes in Secondary Schools.
In addition, the Director or Lauuau_Luii -Lay wwii 111 u
set of rules the conditions on which financial
assistance is made available to the approved post-
secondary colleges and their students. Aid to schools
may consist of one or more of the following grants:49
(a) Recurrent grants: salaries grant, capitation
grant, library grant, administration grant,
janitor staff and cleaning grant, textbook and
stationary grant, rent and rates grant and
passages grant.
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(b) Non-recurrent and capital grants.
The kinds of grant necessary to cover the normal
expenditure of a school is calculated in such a way
that such grants together with income from tuition
fees, normally standard fees approved by ED, should in
general be sufficient to enable an aided school provide
education of a standard acceptable to the Director of
Education. In fact, just like Category I service in
welfare provisions, the subsidy is 100 per cent in
respect of the recurrent expenditure capital grants
for buildings, furniture, equipment and the like are
normally made in the ratio of 80 per cent contribution
by the Government and 20 per cent contribution by the
school.50
The Bought Place Scheme (BPS)
Along with the provision of nine years' compulsory
education, the BPS was instituted by ED to offer
subsidy to different categories of private secondary
schools attaining a reasonable standard by way of
buying places. It was intended to be an ad hoc measure
to cope with the great upsurge of demand for free
secondary places arising from compulsory education with
which both the Government and aided sector would not be
able to meet.51 The basic principle of this scheme is
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that a grant calculated on the basis of the notional
subsidy per place and adjusted for price increaseseach
year is payable to the sponsoring bodies concerned.52
In fiscal 1986-87, that grant was valued at $3,837 per
place, comparing with the nominal $8,752 for aided
schools and $11,891 for Government schools which are
respectively a half and two thirds higher-53 According
to the Education Ordinance, ED exerts fee controls to
avoid subsidising profits. The effect of this is to
make BPS schools dependent on the Scheme for financing.
The low level of grant implies that resources available
to private schools are much less than the Government
and aided counterparts. In other words, the Government
has tended to mobilise private efforts to provide
relatively cheap and consequently inferior school
places to make up the shortfall in provisions from
expediency.54 Accordingly, the Education Commission
Report No. 3 published lately has called for the
abolition of the BPS in due course (be phased out by
the year 2000) and recommended a new Direct Subsidy
Scheme (considered below) in place of it.55 To be sure,
ED as planned has progressively reduced the number of
bought places over the past years (see Table 3.4). In
1987, there were 62,958 places in the BPS, representing
approximately 14 per cent of the total secondary school
demand.56
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Table 3.4 Number of Form I Bought Places
over the Total, 1979-86.
A B
No. of Form I
Year A / BBought Place
109,13258,785 53.8779
51,708 100,438 51. 4880
95,506 51. 2948,99081
90,997 48. 9144, 50582
89, 622 28. 0225, 11183
26. 2188, 34723, 15184
91, 380 25. 5523.35185
24. 3792,94822, 65686
758, 370 39. 33dota 298, 257
Source: Departmental Report, Education
Department, 1980-87.
Medical Health Services
The medical sector is the third area in social services
to which Government subvention goes. Hong Kong's
medical and health services are one of hospital-based.
At present there are 14 Government, 23 subvented and 11
private hospitals, each providing a number of hospital
beds of 12,360 (50.3 per cent), 9,540 (38.8 per cent),
and 2,660 (10.8 per cent).57 Under codes of aid akin to
those of schools, subvented hospitals operated by
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(99 per cent for recurrent expenditure and 100 per cent
for capital expenditure) by Government to make up their
huge shortfall in financial resources.58 They provide
exactly the same services and charge the same fees
mostly as Government hospitals but have contributed
significantly to cost reduction. Expenses per bed are
set at a level by the medical and Health Department
which is only equivalent to one third to a half of
Government beds.59 As a result these hospitals have
been providing a valuable service at a bargain price
that cannot be duplicated by the better-funded public
wards, although quality has been somewhat traded for
cost. It is estimated that at a subvented hospital, a
bed can be barely run for as low as $270 a day, while
at princess Margaret, a public hospital, it may cost as
much as $2,000.60
Constrainted by the level of public funding, the
subsidised medical services are not as thoroughly
equipped and staffed as Government ones. Regarding
establishment, the number of doctors in a subvented
hospital of similar size is usually just one third or
at best a half of the Government's. Soo too are the
nurse-to-bed ratios. It is also glaring in the poor
benefits and promotion prospects of staff in the
subvented sector, resulting in chronically high staff
turnover,61 Over the years, the subsidised medical
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services have been notoriously deteriorating, to the
extent that they are underutilised with a bed occupancy
rate running at about 85 per cent in contrast
Government wards are plagued by overcrowding-62
The Scott Report published in 1985 attempts to address
the problem by creation of a Hospital Authority (see
Chapter II) independent of the civil service which will
seek for an integration of Government and subventec
hospitals by putting the two under its jurisdiction. It
would mean a standardisation of medical services and ar
upgrading of subvented hospitals which are to be made
on par with the public ones in employment policies anc
facilities after the merger.
Two Case Studies of VAs
Tung Wah Group of Hospitals
Founded in 1870 by ordinance, the Tung Wah Group of
Hospitals is assuredly the largest subsidised voluntary
body in the territory. Today this charitable
conglomerate discharges a wide range of activities
geared to the pressing needs of society, by statute,
these are:63
1. to provide the inhabitants of Hong Kong with
medical services in the following institutions:
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(i) the Tung Wah Hospital
(ii) the Kwong Wah Hospital
(iii) the Tung Wah Eastern Hospital
(iv) the Wong Tai Sin Infirmary and
(v) the Tung Wah Sandy Bay Convalescent
Hospital.
2. to manage the Tung Wah Yee Chong and the Wing
Pit Ting farewell pavilion
3. to manage the Man Mo Temple
4. to maintain and manage schools and other
educational institutions in Hong Kong
5. to pay for the burial and reburial of the Chinese
6. to provide funeral services for the Chinese and
7. to maintain and manage homes for the aged to
provide all kinds of social and cultural
services for the Hong Kong community.
In fiscal 1987-88, the Group has 86-87 per cent of its
revenue coming from Government subventions, the balance
being incomes from service fees, rental and private
donations.64 Medical subvention alone has accounted for
more than one third( 36 per cent, see Table 3.6)) of
the total appropriation from the Medical Health
Department for voluntary institutions. The Group's five
hospitals altogether supply more than 4,000 beds,
YAnrPSentina 16 per cent of ward space in Hong Kong.65
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Table 3.6 Percentage of. Government Medical
Subventions (Recurrent Expenditure)
to the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals.
Medical Recurrent Subventions
Tung Wah Group
Yeaz of Hositals(8 PercentageTotal.($)'
1980-81 170, 909,884 446,663,173 38.26
1981-82 214, 920,741 583,81 0, 330 36.81
1982-83 265,294,284 724,856,2 64 36.6
1983-84 29997779000 813,708,000 36.84





Source: Departmental Report, Director of Medical
Health Services, 1 ,81-88.
The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Ordinance of 1971
provides a legal framework for its operation. The
Group's administrative and financial autonomy are given
to its Board of Directors elected once a year in
respect of the day-to-day administration including
raising, collecting funds and making investments. The
Board consists 11-20 members, most of them being
businessmen, professionals and local dignitaries.
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Considering the enormous funds paid from public purse,
accountability is of paramount importance which has
seemed to have been well taken care of in the
Ordinance. Above the Board of Directors is an Advisory
Board whose duty is to advise the directors on any
matters affecting the Group. This Advisory Board with
membership of not more than 14 is to have following ex-
officio members:
(i) the Secretary for District Administration, who
shall be the chairman
(ii) the Secretary for Health and Welfare
(iii) 1 person each of the unofficial members of the
Executive Council and Legislative Council and
(iv) not more than 8 members appointed by the
Governor.
In addition, there is a Medical committee comprislriy
not more than 14 members wholly appointed by the
Governor, which is delegated all necessary powers and
duties to act as the executive and administrative
authroity in all matters relating to the Group's
medical services-- the mainstream of the Group's
activities.
In reality the Advisory Board seldom interferes the
work of t-hP Board of Directors. Its role is rather of
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symbolic value although decision-making power of all
major matters is vested in it. Measures of financial
control are attained by ruling that books of account be
Board of Directors within six months after the
expiration of his terms of office has to send to the
Chief Secretary a statement of the accounts of the
Group. Any transfer or sales of property, immovable and
movable, must obtain the prior consent from the
Governor and the Advisory Board.
Other than a charter, a close scrutiny is deemed
necessary for a proper use of taxpayers' money. Tunc
Wah as a prestigious organisation which has built up ar
image of creditability in the community out of its
century long service, is of no exception. The outbreak
of the FASS issue is a case in point. FASS (Final
Average Salary Scheme) is a non-contributory retirement
scheme launched in 1977 to serve 2,500 employees
through the investment of an unknown sum lodged by the
Group from donations and Government subsidies. Due tc
poor management and faulty investment policies in 1987,
it was on occasion unearthed that there was only $79
million left in the FASS fund-- almost about $11C
million short of the amount needed to settle the claims
of its members. Resentment mounted high amongst the
open at all times to the inspection of any person
appointed by the Governor and the chairman of the
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staff and the dispute has lingered on for nearly a
year. The case finally ended after protracted
negotiation and acceptance on the part of the staff to
a less favourable provident fund scheme. Tung Wah, to
make up the failing fund, for its part, would have to
delay several expansion projects including the
construction of an administration building and the
extension of the out-patient department of the Kwong
Wah Hospital in Kowloon, which would cost the Group a
total of about $40 million, in additon to a pick up of
more than $20 million-- or 80 per cent of its reserve
fund to tie up the rescue package. And the Finance
Committee of the Legislative Council had yet to arrange
a special allotment for an undisclosed amount to close
the case-66
Po Leung Kuk
Founded a bit later than the Tung Wah Group of
Hospitals in 1878, the Po Leung Kuk was first engaged
in the relieving of victims of abduction cases. As time
passes by, it gradually evolved into a welfare giant
offering diversified social services.67 Like Tung Wah,
the Kuk was incorporated'by statute. The Po Leung Kuk
Ordinance of 1973 has set out its statutory activities
as follows:
1_ to provide and maintain a temporary home for
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women and children who are in need of care and
protection until proper provision is made- for
their marriage, adoption or settlement in life
2. to provide vocational training and education in
suitable cases for women and children who are in
its care
3. to establish, maintain and manage homes and
nuresries
4. to establish, maintain and manage schools and
other educational institutions in Hong Kong and
5. to provide all kinds of social services for the
Hong Kong community.
As of March, 1987, by one count, the Po Leung Kuk
operated 11 units of babies, children and girls-' homes
(for orphans, abandoned children and unmarried mothers,
etc.), 21 nurseries, 3 sheltered workshops and 2
hostels for the mentally retarded, 2 old people's
homes, as regards to social welfare services and 8
secondary schools, 12 primary schools, 8 kindergartens
and 4 special schools.68
Mapping out a blueprint for its organisation and
administrative structures, the Ordinance of 1973 bears
exactly the same provisions as those for the Tung Wah
Group of Hospitals given above. Briefly put, the
AvPntive function is vested in an annually-elected
93
Board of Directors which is empowered to run the Kuk
within the confines of the Ordinance. For important
policy decisions, such as those concerning disposals of
property, the Advisory Board,of which the Secretary for
District Administration, Secretary for Health and
Welfare and Director of Social Welfare, are ex-officio
members, must be consulted. Books of account must be
sent each year to a person appointed by the Governor
who is actually the supreme head of the Kuk, for
inspection. Through those provisions, the Government
intends to exercise a watchdog role to see to it that
the moneys it puts in are used in the proper places.
The School Medical Service Scheme
To provide primary health care to school-age children
is a traditional job of modern governments all over the
world. In Hong Kong this is achieved by the School
Medical Service Scheme operated by an independent
statutory School Medical Service Board. The Scheme was
initiated by a working party appointed by Government on
the matter in 1962 and put'into practice in 1964.69 It
offers an economic form of medical treatment service
through Government subvention to all school children in
Primary I to Form III. For a token fee of $10 a year, a
pupil can receive free medical attention from a private
medical practitioner of the school's choice. The
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Government represented by the Board contributes $65 a
year for each pupil. Participation in the Scheme is
voluntary. The school principal has freedom to choose a
doctor in the marketplace and a participation card
tantamount to a medical voucher is issued to each pupil
enrolled.70 As at 31 March, 1988, 439 doctors were
enlisted and over 380,000 school children from 912
schools, representing a coverage of about 48 per cent
of the total eligible school population, participated
in the Scheme-71
The Scheme was however under attack very recently. It
was suggested enrollment would improve if parents and
pupils were approached direct and had a choice of
doctor. Moreover, corruption was found prevalent
between schools and doctors. In October 1988, the
Scheme was revised. A direct approach to parents and
individual choice of doctor were adopted. This switch
has increased enrollment at once by 50,000 in that year
but also received objections from doctors complaining
the services as being too cheap. Subsequently, the
School Medical Service Board will have to further
revise the Scheme in the academic year of 1989-90 by
raising Government contribution to $120 for each pupil
and parents will be charged with an extra fee of $10
for each visit-72 In any case, the School Medical
CAriirP Scheme, be it school-based or home-based, is a
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voucher programme allowing in varying degrees the
consumer's choice and relying on private practice as
the service producer.
The Direct Subsidy Scheme (DSS)
In the Education Commission Report No. 3 released in
June, 1988, a new subsidy programme for the private
secondary schools named the Direct Subsidy Scheme was
put forward to replace the Bought Place Scheme in the
near future. The concept of the DSS is of a scheme
under which the Government can subsidise and encourage
the growth of a strong private school sector, while
allowing schools the maximum freedom with regard to
curricula, fees and entrance requirements that are
consistent with basic educational standards.73 The
financing of DSS schools is a voucher-like arrangement,
which is calculated on a per pupil basis, i.e., the
amount of Government subsidy earmarked for a school is
commensurated with the number of students enrolled (as
opposed to the number of student places available). The
level of financial assistance is all contingent upon a
school's ability to attract students and compete with
its counterparts in the marketplace.
In specific terms, it was recommended that DSS schools,
given the above, be funded by a system of block grants
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assessed according to school fee income. The grant to a
given school should be equal to the difference between
the school's income from fees and the notional cost to
the Government of an aided school with a similar number
of students. Schools with low fees would receive the
full grant for each student whilst the schools with
the highest income would receive a minimum of 25 per
cent of the full grant.74 The core of this Scheme is
for the Government to lift controls on fees, entrance
and curriculum, so that parents can choose schools for
their children. While education voucher has become
increasingly popular in many countries including
Britain, the DSS is certainly a noval programme to the
local educationists.
A heated discussion as to its merits and demerits has
been aroused. The private school sector, possibly the
beneficiary of the Scheme, welcomes it. Most people at
large also applaud it on the ground that it would
promote educational innovation and diversity, parental
interest in education, and school's responsiveness to
parent and student needs. The major objection to the
DSS is founded on the worry that it would lead to a
hierarchy of schools, based on fees, reputation,
qualities, facilities and so on, countering the value
of popular education purported in the adoption of the
nine years' compulsory education.75 And the Report
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seemed to have reinforced that event as it allows that
not only private schools, but all aided schools' are
eligible to applying to join the DSS.76 Those schools
with long history and high prestige in the aided
sector, by going private, will then easily turn to
elitist and rich men's schools.77
CONTRACTING
Contracting describes a process where one organisation
contracts with another for the provision of a
particular good or service.78 It involves two parties:
the one letting the contract and the contractor.
Contracting may exist within the private sector in
which the two parties are private bodies or within the
public sector whereby one sub-national government
contracts with another for the supply of a good or
service. The latter, being known as intergovernmental
agreements, has been in widespread use agmonst the
state and local governments in the United States.79
Contracting may occur across countries. One typical
instance is the international sub-contracting as
called by Michael Sharpston, which refers to a
situation that firms in'developed countries contract
out to producers in developing countries the
manufacture of certain products or components and the
performance of certain processes.80 Another case of
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contracting which is our focus in this chapter, is one
found between the public and private sector, that is,
in the words of Marc Bendick, Jr., the provision of
public goods or services through issuance of contracts
to private firms instead of having those goods or
services produced directly by a government agency.81
Ira Sharkansky and others have identified the
incentives for government to contract out what it may
otherwise do in-house as follows:82
1. To abide by requirements to freeze the size of
civil service even while adding to or enlarging
the programmes being offered.
2. To purchase services cheaper than they can be had
using government employees-- contractors may pay
lower wages, and may avoid the fringe benefits
required for government employees.
3. To permit government to experiment with policies
and new delivery systems. The government can
always terminate a contract if the experiment
fails, with little or no objection by the
affected public.
4. To weaken the power of government employees'
unions by giving work to contractors.
5. To save money through leasing rather than
purchasing new buildings, since the resultant
government budget will show only the annual cost
of the rent, as opposed to the expense of a new
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capital project.
6. To benefit from the existence of voluntary or
charitable organisations that already may be
doing what the government wishes to do.
According to foreign experience, contracting has a wide
application virtually in all kinds of public and social
services ranging from the management of cemetaries,
libraries, car parks and museums, vehicle towing,
nursing services, drug alcohol treatment, laundry
catering services in public hospitals, to tax
collection, to name just a few.83 A number of authors
have tried to set up criteria to compare the
suitability of services to the external (contracting
out) or internal (in-house) provisions. In the
production choice and sector choice model suggested by
James Ferris and Elizabeth Graddy, the factors to be
considered in choosing the mode of service delivery
include labour intensity, scale economies, the need for
standardisation, the degree of collectiveness, a
constituency preference for non-profit production in
health and human services, the preexistence of non-
profit producers, distributional goals and moral hazard
concerns, and tangibleness and simplicity of service
outputs.84 Thus services that are labour-intensive with
simple and tangible-- easy to measure, outputs, but
little distributional and moral concerns will most
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likely be favourably discharged through an external
mode of production by the private for-profit or non-
prof it sector.
O.E. Williamson, to argue from the opposite, has
however identified five conditions in which internal
(hierarchical) provision offers significant advantages
over contracting in the market:85
1. Where flexible sequential decision-making is
needed to cope with uncertainties in the
environment.
2. Where only a small number of competitors are
present, and there is a likelihood of
opportunistic and predatory pricing behaviour.
3. Where a divergence of expectations is likely to
occur between the internal purchaser and the
external seller.
4. Where operational or technological information
gained from experience is likely to give one
external supplier a strategic advantage over all
others, thereby reducing competition.
5. Where a transaction-specific 'calculative
relation' between those parties is inappropriate
and 'quasi-moral involvement' between those
supplying and organising the service is necessary
to effective provision.
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In any event, granted a careful choice of service, as
conceded by Colin Sankey, the Principal Assistant
Financial Sectretary of the Hong Kong Government,
contracting is probably the category that offers most
potential for future privatisation, because the types
of services involved generally lend themselves to easy
definition and contractual agreements.86 The American
local governments used to purchase social welfare
services by means of contracting from the private non-
profit organisations or the third sector, as it is
called,-- an impressive 61 per cent of public
expenditures for social welfare go to that sector to
support the delivery of services under contracts-87
Hong Kong, as we illustrated above, has followed the
other alternative in privatising the delivery of social
services, i.e., by subsidies. As a result contracting
turns out to be not as common as in the other
countries.
At present the Government has contracted out the
management of public car parks to be followed suit by
abattoirs, and certain cleansing services, to the
private sector. The potential candidates for
contracting, as proposed by Government and the public,
in future courses, would include life-savings for
public swimming pools and beaches, refuse collection
--A troatmP_nt (Kowloon Bay refuse transfer station) and
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management of tunnels (Lion Rock and Aberdeen tunnels),
chemical waste treatment plants and parking meters-88
In some cases, the contract may involve the grant of a
franchise to give monopoly of service over a
geographical area, for example, refuse collection in
certain cities of the United States.89 In Hong Kong
franchise contracts are largely found in the utility
sector which we shall consider next in the following
Chapter.
Car Park Management
The management of public car parks had been under
attack in the early 1980s for its poor performance. The
Government itself also was not satisfied for the car
park business had recorded losses for many years.90 In
a speech addressed to the Legislative Council in
October, 1980, Lydia Dunn, now Senior Unofficial Member
of the Executive Council, had queried why the
Commissioner for Transport, with his wide-ranging
statutory and non-statutory duties, had to run car
parks badly.91 She asked, Why cannot management
franchises for these installations be sold by public
tender? I can see no inherent reason why they should
not be and I believe that private enterprise would
manage them better and with more concern for the
ev nrC„mPr_ and still earn a reasonable fee for doing
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so. 1192
In the same year, the Government appointed a working
party on car parking facilities, which among others
proposed the privatisation of public car parks.93 Three
options were put forward: 1. Sale: to sell all existing
public car parks by public tender to interested private
firms 2. Leasing: to lease them to private firms by
public tender in return for a monthly or annual rental
and 3. Management contract: to hand over the management
of car parks to interested private firms through a
contract in return for a premium or rental on a
revenue-sharing basis-94 The third option was adopted
and a total of 42 tenders were submitted by 21
companies in 1983.95 All 10 (increased to 11 in 1986
with the opening of the Tsuen Wan Transport Complex)
Government multi-storey car parks were come under
private management in 1984.
Under a contract, Wilson Parking (Hong Kong) Ltd., one
of the bidders, was elected to manage the facilities
for a period of three years.96 According to the
contract, after operating for three months, Wilson
Parking would raise the parking charges up to 50 per
cent in some of the car parks to bring the charges
comparable to commercial rates. But any change of rates
thereafter must obtain the prior approval of Government
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who was also entitled to a share of 80 per cent of the
net gains.97 At present the fees charged in these
Government multi-storey facilities are more or less
comparable to those of the privately-owned car parks.
Under the management of Wilson Parking, an experienced
garage operator which also runs car park business in
New Zealand and Singapore, the utilisation of public
car parks and the operating receipts were both
improved. In 1987 the Government renewed the contract
with Wilson Parking-98
Urban Council: Cleansing Services, Management or
Abattoirs and Others
The Urban Council, through its executive arm, the Urban
Services Department, discharges a host of municipal
functions like street cleaning, refuse disposal, pest
control, and the management of abattoirs, public
conveniences and bath houses, funeral parlours and
undertakers, tennis courts, parks, playgrounds, public
libraries, museums and art galleries, etc.99 These
services, obviously having specific and simple outputs,
as mentioned before, are good candidates for
contracting. In fact the call for privatisation has
been looming large at the Council in recent years. Kim
Cham, an Urban Councillor at the time, speaking at its
^r„ Ao- tP in 1986, sugested, The community will
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benefit through a reduction of subsidies to the
privatised services, which will be subject to' the
viability of the business. Customers will benefit from
higher standards through the more efficient provision
of public services,100 He said that experiments by the
Council on privatisation had indicated it could also
bring cost savings and such savings certainly justified
their continued effort to experiment further.101
Since 1984 the Urban Services Department, in accordance
with the recommendations of the council, has
successively undertaken privatisation schemes to
contract out cleansing services in the Shaukiwan
Squatter Area, Ma Hang Village in Stanley which is a
self-cleansing scheme, Kong Sin Wan Village and the
cleansing of public toilets in Western Kowloon.102 A
total of four cleansing contracts have been let for
those areas. The schemes are successful and have proven
to save public funds over the original system whereby
the job was carried out by direct labour of the
Department. The Council therefore considers extending
these schemes to more areas which for this year (1989)
would include in addition the cleansing of public
toilets, playgrounds and changing rooms in public parks
in the area of Tsimshatsui, Yaumati and Mongkok the
cleansing of public toilets, bathhouses and changing
rooms in the area of Kwun Tong, Wong Tai Sin and
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Kowloon City and the area of Hong Kong Island.103 The
total value of the contracts will amount to $11 million
which would save the Department 600 labours and $25
million in money terms.-04 The Department pledged that
it would exert greatest care to see to it that the
contract cleaners have observed the terms of the
contracts, failing which the contractors will be
charged with a fine equal to two times of their
remunerations.105 To enhance competition and reduce
risks, the Department does not incline to a franchised
cleaner, instead, the contract will be let to each
small area so that more companies could participate
into the tender exercises-106
The Council operates two multi-storey abattoirs, one az
Kennedy Town on Hong Kong Island and the other at
Cheung Sha Wan in Kowloon. They unfortunately have
suffered from deficit amounting to $41 million each
year.107 Sheerly on fiscal ground, the Council has
every reason to privatise their operations which could
by one count, reduce'workers from 200 to 100 for the
Kennedy Town abattoir alone (due to civil service
rules, a lot more labours are required to work on shift
than that of a private company).108 The contract, on a
five-yearly basis, would probably be awarded in a year
or so to Ng Fung Hong, a fully-owned subsidiary of
China Resources (Holdings) Co., Ltd. The Company
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handles wholesale trading of all China-imported
livestocks in Hong Kong.109 The greatest stumbling
block to the privatisation scheme is on disestablishing
the existing staff of the abattoirs. The Council is
reluctant to compensate them, like those of the
Kowloon-Canton Railway, for their leave, the expense of
which would amount to $28 million.110 Time has been
expended in negotiating the transfer of the staff to
other departments which consequently delays the
privatisation of the Kennedy Town abattoir planned as
early as 1983.111
Besides cleansing services and the management or
abattoirs, the Council has also pondered contracting
out the life-saving jobs in swimming pools and
beaches.112 On the whole, given the myriad of services
of the Council being highly suitable for contracting,
the pace of privatisation in its Urban Services
Department has been slower than what the Councillors
expected. The reason, as they gave, is largely
attributed to the problem associated with
disestablishing the public employees concerned.113
SUMMARY
In the foregoing we have highlighted, as far as
possible, the different modes of financial arrangements
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by means of subsidies catered to private efforts in the
delivery of social services in Hong Kong. Two classes
of subsidy programmes can be distinguished: in one
instance subventions are given to selective service
producers and in the other they go direct to the
pockets of qualified consumers, which has come to be
known as vouchers.
The three pillars of social services, social welfare,
education and health are heavily subsidised by
Government through cooperation with the voluntary
sector which has now discharged two thirds of all
social welfare and education (primary and secondary)
servics and almost a half of the hospital care in Hong
Kong. Hui Yin-Fat, Executive Director of the HKCSS, has
likened their partnership to a house-keeper/ revenue-
spender relationship.114 Paid actually by Government,
VAs have employed more than 70,000 people which is
equivalent to more than one third of the total civil
service force.115 Subventions to those sectors account
for 20 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure in
the public budget.116
Health, education and welfare are often thought of as
merit goods by economists associated with positive
externalities vital to national development. 117
Although the government used to devote close to half of
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the total expenditure on those areas, this only
represents a very low percentage compared with the GNP
(cf. Chapter I). The fiscal constraint inherent in the
budgetary policies has made it impossible for
Government to provide these services by itself in
suffficient quantities. As noted by one Legislative
Councillor, the Government's social policy therefore
aims to provide maximum social services through
voluntary agencies at a minimum cost.11-8 The reason
for VAs to come into prominence is precisely due to its
ability to discharge similar level of services quality-
wise, given an appropriate control, at cheaper cost,
not to mention their flexibility and the role in
trimming and taming the size of the civil service.
Small wonder, though most of the voluntary institutions
are fully subsidised, the Government has hesitated so
far to take over anyone because it is getting a bargain
service.
Besides subsidies and vouchers, a third arrangement
through which the Government buys services from the
private sector is contracting. Our study shows that
most municipal services presently delivered by the
Urban Services Department under the direction of the
Urban Council are good candidates for contracting.
Mainly because of the difficulty arising from the
disestablishment of the existinq civil service staff, a
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cautious approach has been followed by Government. This




FRANCHISES AND JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES
This chapter will be devoted to an analysis of
franchises and joint-stock companies, two
institutional arrangements for privatisation found
particularly in the utility sector of Hong Kong. As
before, it will focus on the organisation structure and
design, monitoring and control, and management system
and performance associated with those arrangements.
Since utility services are an important economic
activity,- considering the huge and long-term
investments they are engaged, the following discussions
will also touch on the kind of government-business
relation existing in that particular sector, if not
the economy as a whole.
In public services, electricity, transport and
telecommunications facilities, etc., are basic
necessities used simultaneously by a lot of people--
hence the name of public utilities, and can deeply
affected their livelihood. To use E.S. Savas's typology
(see Chapter I), the great bulk of them are toll
services, i.e., it is possible to charge for them and
to exclude nonpayers.l The provisions of the most
frequently used and general mode of public utilities
like-- in our city, buses, ferries, tramways, tunnels,
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and surely electric power are the duty and province of
governments. Instead of direct provisions, in Hong
Kong, these essential services which, as conceded by
the Financial Secretary in 1982, are Government's
responsibility to arrange for their availability,2 are
turned over to the private sector, or in some
instances, to (public-private) joint-stock companies
involving some Government shares, through franchises or
franchise-like arrangements.
Franchise is an institution of granting privileges
under which a private company is appointed by
government to provide a particular service on a
monopoly basis, at specified standards, tariffs and
period of time usually extending to tens of years.3
Franchises or its similar arrangements are particularly
suitable for utility services, because the outstanding
economic characteristics of those is that they operate
at greatest efficiency as monopolies. There are in the
main two reasons for that. First is the equipment used
by utilities usually have a long life and require heavy
investment the award of an exclusive right of
operation for a sufficiently long period might
guarantee to the private vendor the investment return.
Second is the economies of scale, i.e., the fall of
unit costs with the increasing size of coverage of
-r-W ,oc 4 example, in the generation and
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transmission of electricity, in the United States, the
unit costs of a 550-megawatt oil-fried generating
station are estimated to be some 20 per cent less than
the unit costs of a 225-megawatt station-5 In the
public transport sector, an areawide monopoly may
further benefit from scale economies in the way of
cross-subsidisation, i.e., the support of weak routes
out of the surpluses earned on strong ones, and peak-
hour services on off-peak ones-6
In Hong Kong the monopoly or quasi-monopoly




3. By grant of right of contruction and operation
and
4. By contractual agreements.
Legally, franchises designate a full monopoly of
service. Licences may or may not be monopolistic,
depending on how the law provide for it. The last two
do not specify a monopoly as such, but in actuality are
given an exclusive right of operation. Table 4.1
presents a list of private utility companies awarded
franchises or the like in chronological order by date
of incorporation or commencement.7
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Table 4.1 Private Utility Companies in Hong Kong.
Date of Incorporation/
Name of Company Commencement Mode of Monopoly
Hongkong Electric Co., 24 Jan., 188 9 By contractual agreement
Star Ferry Co., Ltd. 23 April, 1898 By franchise
Hongkong Tramways Co., Ltd. 7 Feb., 1902 By grant of right of
construction operation
Peak Tramways Co., Ltd. 18 Oct., 1905 By grant of right of
construction operation
China Light Power Co., Ltd. 28 Dec., 1918 By contractual agreement
Hongkong Yaumati Ferry Co., Ltd. (HYF) 5 Nov., 1923 By franchise
Hong Kong Telephone Co., Ltd. 24 Jan., 1925 By licence
Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933), Ltd. (KMB) 15 April, 1933 By franchise
By franchise•China Motor Bus Co.. Ltd. (CMB) 28 April, 1933
ECross-Harbour Tunnel Co., Ltd. 206 April, 1965 By franchise
ECable wireless (HK) Ltd. 11 Sept., 1981 By licence
Eastern Harbour Crossing Co., Ltd. 1 Aug., 1986 By franchise
Public-private joint-stock companies.
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The provision of utility services is often regarded as
an activity that is too important to be left to' the
free play of economic markets, considering the public
interest it affects. The basic philosophy of the
Government has been that the operation of the utilities
should work on commercial lines, with the Government
providing a statutory framework for regulation and a
degree of coordination-8 The Secretary for Economic
Services in 1982 had revealed that in its relations
with the utility companies, the Government seeks to
achieve the following five objectives:9
(i) to ensure that the consumers enjoy a reliable
service in line with rising demand
(ii) to ensure that the consumers pay a reasonable
price for the service and do not suffer
because of the monopoly or quasi-monopoly
nature of the utility
(iii) to ensure that the share-holders in a utility
company obtain a return on their investment
which is reasonable and which will encourage
them to provide adequate further investment
when required
(iv) to ensure that the long-term financial well
being of the company is assured, so that it
can raise funds in the markets and so that it
does not encounter financial difficulties that
might put in jeopardy the company and the
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utility and
(v) to achieve the above-mentioned objectives. with
the minimum of Government involvement in the
operations of the companies so that they
themselves are answerable directly to the
consumers.
In a word, the role of the Government is to balance the
interests of consumers and shareholders of utilities,
acting as an intermediary between them.
By Franchises
Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (19 3 3), Ltd. (KMB),
China Motor Bus Co., Ltd. (CMB)
The Franchise
Before 1933 there were six small bus companies operated
in Kowloon and Hong Kong Island without
concessions. In 1933 they were merged to form the
Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933), Ltd. (KMB) and China
Motor Bus Co., Ltd. (CMB), upon an award of a licence
(later changed to franchise) for a fifteen-year period,
,r.rhirh thev anulied earlier, to each of them.10
The present franchises of the two bus companies were
cTranted under the Public Omnibus Services Ordinance
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1975 (re-named Public Bus Service Ordinance in 1982)
with an initial period of ten years renewable at *two-
yearly intervals. The Ordinance (Cap. 230) states that
the Governor-in-Council may grant to any company
registered under the Companies Ordinance the right to
specifies by order and a franchise may confer on the
grantee the exclusive right to operate such a service
in these routes (Section 5(1) (2)). The franchise may
be granted following a public tender or in such other
manner as the Governor-in-Council thinks fit (S.
5(3a)). In return the Ordinance empowers the Government
to supervise the planning and operation of bus services
in many respects. Section 9 has allowed for the
appointment of two Government nominees to the Board of
Directors of the two bus companies, who may not be
removed from the Board except by the Governor and are
entitled to participate at meeting of and have access
to all material which is available to any other
director, concerning the affairs of the companies. In
1988 these two Government-appointed directors were
James so Yiu-cho, the commissioner for Transport, and
Alice Lai Siu Po-chun, Deputy Secretary for Transport
for both KMB and CMB (The same officials also sat on
the Board of the two ferry companies, see below).11 But
it has been revealed that the role as a director of CMB
is hampered by the infrequent meetings of the full
operate a public bus service in such routes as he
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Board and the partial delegation of Board authority to
an Executive Committee consisting of a restricted
number of directors excluding those appointed by the
Governor.12
The two bus companies are also required to prepare a
programme not later than 30 June each year of the
operations of the companies for the following five
years to be approved by the Commissioner for Transport
(S. 12A). Failure without reasonable excuse to comply
with such agreed programme shall mean that the company
is incapable of maintaining a proper and efficient
service. The programme must contain the following
contents: a bus route development plan with an estimate
of the number and types of buses required to achieve
the plan an estimate of the overall number of buses
required to meet daily requirement a plan for the
scrapping of buses a plan for the maintenance of
vehicles and a forecast of the financial implication
of doing all these. Section 18 requires the companies
to keep, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner,
proper records, including records of vehicle
maintenance and stores, to make these records available
for inspection and to provide copies on request. The
Commissioner or any person authorised by him is
empowered under Section 21 to:




iii) require the carrying out of any repairs or
maintenance he considers necessary within a
specified time
iv) require the companies to afford facilities for
inspection of buses and
v) require the companies to carry out in respect
of all or any vehicle used by them in
connection with their franchises any
maintenance and serving in accordance with any
programme.
Financially the companies have to produce to the
Financial Secretary as he so requests books of account
and information in relation to operations of the public
bus services (S. 32). Besides, Section 22 enables the
Governor-in-Council to impose financial penalties in
respect of a failure by a bus company to comply with
the conditions of its franchises. However such
penalties have never been imposed, possibly partly
because the bus company would be able to include any
such financial penalty in its operating costs without
reducing its permitted return under the Profit Control
scheme stipulated in the Ordinance.13
The Profit Control Scheme
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The Governor-in-Council is empowered to determine the
scale of fares (S. 13(la)) on any specified route.*Thus
in 1984 the Transport Department had fixed the express
bus fares for the Island Eastern Corridor due opening
at $2.50, when ironically the bus Company wanted it set
20 cents cheaper, in an attempt to lower the
competitive gap between buses on the Corridor and the
Island Line of the MTR coming on stream the next
year.14 However the Commissioner for Transport may
permit the bus companies to increase the fares subject
to compliance to terms and conditions as laid down in
the Profit Control Scheme which rules that the
permitted return to the bus companies in an accounting
year is an amount (after deduction of taxes) equal to
the percentage per annum specified in the franchises of
their average net fixed assets in that accounting year
(S. 28(1)). In the Scheme of Control Agreement (SCA)
entered into by the Government with the two bus
companies respectively (also with the two power
companies and Hong Kong Telephone, see below) effective
from 1.9.75 to 31.8.87, this percentage was set at 16
per cent per annum for KMB and 15 per cent for CMB,
safeguarded by using the Development Fund as profit
equalisation funds. That is, profits in excess of the
permitted return are credited to the Development Fund
as a liability reserved for the acquisition of fixed
assets (S. 28(3)) conversely, if the profit in any
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year is less than the permitted return, the balance of
the Development Fund will be used from time to time to
make up the shortfall (S. 28(4) (5)). This
arrangement apparently is to compromise the interests
of the travelling public and the bus companies by
imposing a ceiling to the profits as well as offering a
guarantee to a reasonable return, to maintain the
latter's financial viability for re-investment.
It must be pointed out that the practices on proiiL
control are not the inventions of Hong Kong. They in
fact are originated from the United States which has
adopted the same device to regulate the franchised
operators in the electricity and telephone utilities.15
Referring to the American experience, the maximum
permitted return provision, as noted by Gabriel Roth
could induce concessionaires to invest as much as
possible in order to increase the rate base.
Furthermore there is little incentive to reduce other
costs, as the regulators tend to remunerate concession
holders on a cost-plus basis.16 It seems the same
applies to Hong Kong and the SCA has turned out to the
contrary a weapon of the two bus companies for seeking
fare increases. Each opening of new routes and purchase
of new buses can expand the value of the fixed assets
and ultimately lead to a larger profit. Maria Tam Wai-
chu, Chairman of the powerful Transport Advisory
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Committee (TAC), commenting on the latest fare hike of
KMB in January, 1989, has succinctly remarked, ''What
the TAC based is the Profit Control Scheme. Insofar as
KMB can prove by figures that its profit is lower than
the 16 per cent of permitted return, comparing with the
net fixed assets, the TAC can do nothing but to approve
the fare increase-The SCA is a commercial contract
which cannot be altered except with the consent of both
17
signatories.
The TAC, composed in part of unofficial members
appointed by the Governor and in part of officials
including the Secretary for District Administration,
Secretary for Economic Services, Commissioner of
Police, Commissioner for Transport annd Director of
Highways, is a non-statutory body function to advise
the Governor-in-Council on all transport matters.18
Like other advisory committees, it has been conferred
no formal powers for decision-making, yet by
convention, the Governor-in-Council will not accept any
policy proposal on public transports not endorsed by
the TAC.19 In that sense, it functions very much like a
regulatory commission which has jurisdiction over the
transport utilities.20 To change the fare structure, as
a formality, the bus companies (other privately-run
transport utilities being the same) must file their
application to the Transport Department as well as the
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TAC albeit the final decision rests with the Governor-
in-Council.
Revocation of Franchise
Most franchise legislations will contain a provision
for revocation. Section 23 of the Ordinance requires
that if the Governor-in-Council considers that an
emergency exists he may direct that the franchise of a
grantee be suspended. The franchise will also be
revoked if it appears to the Governor-in-Council that
without good cause a grantee has failed to maintain a
proper and efficient public bus service or to pay any
financial penalty imposed. In the event of that, the
Government may take possession of any property the
grantee keeps in connection with its franchise which
may be used by it or by its nominee in the operation of
such bus service as the Commissioner for Transport
thinks fit and the grantee will be entitled to
compensation by the Government. Utilities are to serve
the public their services cannot stop even with the
termination of the franchise. The world's practice
therefore is to confer under that situation the
Government with an option to acquire private utility
properties by assuring a just compensation in return-21
In recent years, it seems KMB has entertained a better
reputation than CMB. complaints received by the
Transport Department on KMB has been notably lower than
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its counterpart.22 In 1985 upon the expiry of the
initial ten years of franchise, KMB was awarded another
ten-year franchise extending to 1995. In contrast CMB
was required to renew its franchise every two years
after 1985.23
There was at least on one occasion that CMB had faced
with a cessation of franchise. In January, 1984, an
appalling bus tragedy in Happy Valley in which six
people were killed and eight others injured, Hong
Kong's worst bus accident in history, had turned the
public spotlight on CMB.24 Subsequently a working group
was appointed by the TAC to look into the matter. The
Report it published in April, 1985, disclosed that 50
per cent of CMB's fleet was eight years old on average,
coupled with bad maintenance and poor management.25 The
Government had allegedly given a warning, the toughest
ever of its kind, to CMB of a probable withdrawal of
franchise. It was claimed that the Transport Department
was considering a few alternatives to running the
Island bus service, including nationalising CMB, or
else asking KMB or the MTR to take over-26 In the
aftermath, the Government had held back using the
franchise renewal as a lever against CMB. Instead a
CMB-Transport Department Liaison Committee was
established to implement the recommendations of the TAC
Report in a bid to upgrade its maintenance and service
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standards.27 After all, as pointed out by a
commentator, It is an unenviable predicament but the
fact is that while commuters may not regard KMB as a
paragon of virtue, it at least operates more
efficiently and with far better discipline than CMB. If
one can run at acceptable standards, why not the
other.28
Honakona Yaumati Ferry (HYF) Star Ferry
The principal ferry services are operated under
franchises by Hongkong Yaumati Ferry (HYF) and Star
Ferry. HYF, established in 1923, is the largest local
passenger shipping company in the world and operates on
a fifteen-year franchise which next expires in 1999.29
At the end of 1986, the Company has 76 vessels in
operation and was running twelve cross-harbour
passenger ferry services, two combined cross-harbour
passenger/vehicular services, three cross-harbour
vehicular-only ferry services and nine regular outlying
district passenger services. During 1986 HYF'carried
76.5 million passengers and 4.3 million vehicles.30
Star Ferry was formed in 1898. It operates two cross-
harbour services using 10 double-ended vessels which
have carried 40.8 million passengers in 1986.31
The present franchises of the two ferry companies were
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granted under Section 6 of the Ferry Services ordinance
1982 (Cap. 104) which conferred the exclusive right on
the grantee to operate a ferry service between such
points as are specified by the Governor-in-Council. The
duration of the franchise is 15 years allowing renewal
for the same length of time.
The terms and conditions governing the control and
operation of the ferry franchises mostly resemble
those of the bus companies. Two Government officials
will sit on the Board of Directors. The Commissioner
for Transport may specify the frequency of services and
carrying capacity and types of vessels as well as the
piers. and berths used by the franchised services. Not
later than 30 November of each year,the ferry companies
must reach agreements with the Commissioner as regards
to a plan relating to their operations for the next
five years. The failure to comply with such a plan will
be amounted toa breach of its franchise or a failure
to maintain a proper and efficient service. The
Director of Civil Engineering Services and Director of
Marine are empowered to inspect at all reasonable times
the premises, piers, equipment, ferry vessels used by
the ferry companies in connection with the franchises.
The Financial Secretary may also check and take away
copies of any records and accounts relating to the
franchise. And the Governor-in-Council can impose a
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financial penalty in the event of failure to comply
with its franchise.
Last but not least, the franchises may be revoked
should an emergency exist and they fail to maintain a
proper and efficient service, and the Government may
take possession of any property concerning the
franchise by compensation. Besides the fares are all
determined by the Governor-in-Council, however the
ferry companies may apply in writing to it through the
Commissioner for a revision of charges.
Different from the two franchised bus companies, the
Government has not entered into any agreement of profit
control with HYF and Star Ferry. This was probably
deemed unnecessary in view of the drop in earnings and
decline in patronage of routes and the competitive
strength of ferry services, from 132 million passengers
in 1980 to 84 million in 1985,32 following the opening
of the Cross-Harbour Tunnel in 1969 and the MTR network
since 1980. To compete with the other modes of cross-
harbour services, the two ferry companies can no longer
boost profits through raising fares but by renovating
their facilities and operation which is especially true
for HYF.33 After all it is worth mentioning that Star
Ferry, charging at 70 cents on lower deck and $1 on




Cross-Harbour Tunnel, Eastern Harbour Crossing
Tate's Cairn Tunnel
In Hong Kong, tunnel is an important utility, given its
insular position and hilly topography. The Government
has directly constructed and operated the Lion Rock
Tunnel and Aberdeen Tunnel which are but minor projects
in comparison with the Cross-Harbour Tunnel (CHT),
Eastern Harbour Crossing (EHC) and Tate's Cairn Tunnel.
In 1965 the Legislative Council passea a resoluiluii
approving the grant of a franchise to Victoria City
Development Co., Ltd., to construct and operate a
vehicular tunnel between Wanchai and Hung Hom.
Construction work started in 1969 with the
incorporation of the Cross-Harbour Tunnel Co., Ltd.
formed by an international consortium including
Victoria city under the Cross-Harbour Tunnel Ordinance
1969 (Cap. 203).34 The total construction cost was
approximately $256 million. In 1972 the Tunnel was put
into operation and now has become the busiest tunnel in
the world, with an average of 120,000 vehicles passing
the Tunnel per day.35
hp construction of the Eastern Harbour Crossing
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basically followed the same model as the Cross-Harbour
Tunnel. In 1985 the Governor-in-Council, from among the
nine multi-national bids received, awarded the tender
to finance, construct and operate the Tunnel to a
consortium formed by investors from Japan, Britain,
China and Hong Kong, under the name of the New Hong
Kong Tunnel Co., Ltd. (NHKTC). These include Kumagai
Gumi Co., Ltd., China International Trust Investment
Corporation (CITIC), Paul Y. Construction Co., Ltd. and
Lilley Construction Ltd.36 The Eastern Harbour
Crossing, a second cross-harbour tunnel in Hong Kong,
links Quarry Bay and Cha Kwo Ling in the Eastern part
of Hong Kong. The whole project, comprising a series of
road and rail tunnels, costs about $3.3 billion.37 The
rail part will be leased to the MTRC for the franchise
period. NHKTC°s share-holders, excluding the
Government, pooled a total of $1.1 billion in equity
financing, with the rest provided by bank credit
facilities offered by 34 financial institutions.
This is one of the biggest loans of its type in
history-38 The Secretary for Transport explained that
the construction of the Eastern Harbour Crossing was
purely a private investment project which the
Government would not participate in the way of funding
nor providing guarantees-39 It was said that the
r, orn,r,Pnt had been involving in too many public work
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projects. To turn over some of those to reliable
private undertaking in terms of construction, financing
and operation would not only curtail the public burden
but also entrust to the community a viable service.40
A road franchise for 30 years (same as the Cross-
Harbour Tunnel) and a rail franchise for 18 1/2 years,
commencing at the start of construction, was separately
granted under the Eastern Harbour Crossing Ordinance
1986 (Cap. 215). NHKTC which holds both franchises, has
assigned the rail franchise to the Eastern Harbour
Crossing Co., Ltd. (EHC) owned 90 per cent by Kumagai
Gumi and 10 per cent by CITIC.41 In accordance-with the
Ordinance, the Government shall hold 5 per cent of the
shares contributed in form of land grants and others
which will be increased to 7.5 per cent upon the
opening of the Tate's Cairn Tunnel. Fig. 3 gives a
graphical representation of the organisation of the
Eastern Harbour Crossing project. In October, 1989, the
Tunnel has been put into full operation.
The Tate's Cairn Tunnel, which links Siu Lek Yuen in
Shatin and Diamond Hill in Kowloon, is to serve as an
alternative route to the much congested Lion Rock
Tunnel. In 1989 the Gammon-Nishimatsu consortium-- an
Anglo-Japanese group made up of Nishimatsu Construction
Co., Jardine Matheson Co., Trafalgar House PLC.,
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Source: SCNP, 9 September, 1989.
Standard Chartered Asia and C.Itoh Co. in an
public tender earned the 30-year franchise to construct
and operate the Tunnel. It is the first land tunnel to
be built and operated in Hong Kong by the private
sector.42
The Secretary for Transport, Michael Leung Man-Kin,
said that the consortium was selected partly because it
proposed a $4 fare for cars, taxis and motorcycles and
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guaranteed that the tolls would be kept stable for the
first five years of operation. The other factors the
Government considered when awarding the projecat were
the group's financial resources and management, its
experience in construction and the ability to finish
the work quickly-43
The construction of the Tate's Cairn Tunnel will cost
about $2 billion and the four-kilometre Tunnel will be
the longest in Hong Kong, doubling the length of the
Aberdeen and the Cross-Harbour tunnels and being three
times of that of the Lion Rock Tunnel.44 The work
started as soon as the Tate's Cairn Tunnel Ordinance
granting the franchise was enacted by the Legislative
Council and was scheduled to complete by the middle of
1991.45
The Franchise
Like the bus and ferry companies, in tunnel franchises,
the Government may appoint two officials to the Board
of Directors (S.6(2)', CHT Ordinance, and S. 11 (2), EHC
Ordinance). The Government is also entitled to holding
a certain percentage of shares of the paid-up capital
of the tunnel companies which are respectively 10 per
cent or more for CHT and 5 per cent and 7.5 per cent
upon the opening of the Tate's Cairn Tunnel for EHC
S.62), CHT Ordinance, and S. 13 (la 1b), EHC
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Ordinance). At present the Government holds 25 per cent
of the equity of CHT.46 In return for the franchise,
the Government will charge the companies a royalty
based on the annual gross revenue or operating receipts
of the tunnel. This is 12 1/2 per cent for CHT (S.14)
and 2 1/2 per cent in the initial five years and 5 per
cent thereafter for the Tate's Cairn Tunnel.47 The bus
and ferry franchises do not require any payment of
royalty probably because tunnel operations are
relatively speaking a much more profitable business
(see below).
The Financial Secretary and Commissioner for Transport,
for the purpose of ascertaining the royalty payable,
are empowered to check all books of account and records
kept by the companies as required (S.15 59(2), CHT
Ordinance, and S.53(2), EHC Ordinance). The
Commissioner may also enter the tunnel area at any time
for inspection purposes (S.39, CHT Ordinance, and S.52,
EHC Ordinance). The Director of Highways may by notice
in writing, require the tunnel companies to effect such
repairs and alternations to the tunnel structures as he
considers necessary (S.48, CHT Ordinance, and S.41, EHC
Ordinance). Any 1,000 or more persons, being either
rate-payers or owners of motor vehicles, may appeal
collectively by petition to the Governor-in-Council,
should they be of opinion that the company has failed
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to maintain adequate, efficient or safe facilities for
the passages of vehicles (S.57, CHT Ordinance).
Like the bus and ferry companies, provisions for
revocation of franchises have been given special
emphasis. It is ruled that if the Governor-in-Council
is of the opinion that there has been a substantial
failure of the Company to comply with any of the
provisions of the ordinance, there is in power for
revocation of franchise by the Governor-in-Council.
Should that happen, the assets of the Company shall
vest in the Government which will compensate same with
a sum agreed upon between them. Failing such agreement
may be determined by arbitration under the Arbitration
Ordinance (S.51-53, CHT Ordinance, and S.69-71, EHC
Ordinance).
The following two provisions however are not present in
the bus and ferry franchises. The Governor-in-Council
may, if he is satisfied that it is necessary to do so
in the interest of public security, order that the
Government shall take over the operation of the tunnel
together with the property of the company as is
necessary and continue such operation until the
Governor-in-Council otherwise orders. Again the company
shall be compensated for such take-over by the
Government by a sum to be agreed upon (S.38, CHT
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Ordinance). And most important of all, it must be noted
that on expiration of the franchise period, no
compensation will be payable by the Government to the
company, except the depreciated value of any machinery,
equipment or plant forming part of the assets purchased
by the company, with the agreement of the Financial
Secretary within the five years next preceding the
expiration of the period of the grant and owned by the
company on such expiration (S.54, CHT Ordinance, and
S.72, EHC Ordinance). In other words, the tunnel will
belong to the Government upon the expiration of the
franchise period.
Not surprisely, as conceded by the Secretary for
Transport, the Government is much in favour of turning
public projects like tunnels to the private sector, for
it can finally get hold of the tunnel without spending
a penny.48 For the bidders in a tunnel tender, the
investment still looks attractive despite the presence
of that provision, bearing in mind that tunnel
operation, in the Hong Kong context, is an extremely
lucrative busines with extraordinarily high rate of
return, let alone the fact that the franchise time,
extending to a period of thirty years, is sufficiently
long to payoff the investment.
By one count, it has been reckoned that for each dollar
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invested in the CHT, the return would be as high as
$0.6, i.e., 60 per cent, topping all other utilities.49
This high rate of return explains why the Government
has repeatedly rejected varying the tolls for CHT
which, by statute, has a power to determine (S.40-44,
CHT Ordinance, and S.55-59, EHC Ordinance). In 1984 to
curb the use of the much congested Tunnel, the
Government has resorted to imposing a passage tax by
its own for all vehicles except public transports
instead of approving the Company's application made
earlier for an increase in tolls-50 Obviously the
Government's approach is that the Tunnel profit has
been staying too high to justify any change of tolls
albeit the Company has not raised same since its
opening 17 years ago-51
By Licences
Hong Kong Telephone Cable Wireless
In the early years of Hong Kong, the Government
operated directly most of the telephone and telegraphic
services through the Post office formed in 1841. This
sector was completely privatised with the hand over
of the telegraphic services to Cable Wireless Ltd. in
1948 and telephone services to Hong Kong Telephone Co.,
Ltd. in 1951.52 In February, 1988 the two companies
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were merged to form the Hong Kong Telecommunications
Ltd. Cable Wireless of Britain owns 80 per cent of
its shares and the Hong Kong Government, 10.1 per cent,
the balance being left to the stock market. Hong Kong
Telephone became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hong Kong
Telecommunications, and Cable Wirless of Hong Kong,
its associated company which is also 40 per cent owned
by Cable Wireless (Far East) Ltd.53
So to speak, the two telephone and telegraphic
utilities are joint-ventures of Cable Wireless of
Britain and the Government. They operate under licences
granted to them respectively under the
Telecommunication Ordinance (Cap. 106) and in addition
the Telephone Ordinance for Hong Kong Telephone. The
Telecommunication ordinance specifies that a licence
granted by the Governor-in-Council shall be valid for
such period and shall be subject to the payment of such
fee, royalty or other charge whatsoever shall be
subject to such conditions as the Governor-in-Council
may specify and, where the Governor-in-Council
considers it desirable in the public interest, may
confer on the grantee to whom it is granted an
exclusive right to maintain any service to the public
in connexion with which the licence is granted (S.34).
The present licence of Hong Kong Telephone is valid for
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20 years commencing 1975 and 25 years for Cable
Wireless from 1981.54 Both licences granted them the
sole right to supply and operate public telephonic
communication within Hong Kong, including truck line
telephonic communication for communicating with places
outside Hong Kong for Hong Kong Telephone, and truck
line communication by means of submarine cable from
Hong Kong to places outside Hong Kong for Cable
Wirless.
the regulation and control governing the operation of
these two licenced services are similar to those of the
franchised business. Above all the Government may
appoint two public officers to their Board of
Directors. In 1988 they were Yeung Kai-yin, the
Director of Industry and Roger William Candler, Deputy
Secretary for Monetary Affairs.55 The Telephone
Ordinance requires that the company shall at all times
during the continuance of the concession provide and
maintain to the satisfaction of the Postmaster General
a good, efficient and continuous-service of public
telephonic communication with modern appliances
including all reasonable modern inventions. It will
afford to the Postmaster General all facilities for
inspection and testing of its plants, works, apparatus,
instruments, fittings and other material thereon as
well as such information relative to the conduct of the
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Company's businsess if he so requests. The Company
shall permit the Director of Accounting Services tc
inspect. and take copies of the books of account
relating to the licenced service.
The Government is empowered to take over and purchase
undertakings of the Company in certain events such as
failing to observe its obligations under the-ordinance,
going into liquidation or ceasing to carry on business.
The price to be paid by the Government shall be
determined by arbitration if the same cannot be agreed
upon by the parties. However if upon the expiration of
the concession, no arrangements are made for the
continuance of supply by the Company or if the
Government does not elect to take over and purchase the
Company's undertakings, the Government may, on the
expiration of the concession, require the Company to
remove all works erected or made by the company in
connexion with the licence.
On the financial side, the Company is entitled to
charge its subscribers fees not exceeding those
specified in the Schedule in the Ordinance and is
allowed to amend same by'resolution of the Legislative
Council. Failing agreement of such revision between the
parties shall be referred to arbitration. In 1975 after
severe criticism from the public on a rise of
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telephone charges, the Government entered into a Scheme
of Control Agreement for an effective period of 1.1.76
30.6.95 with the Company which rules that its maximum
permitted return will not exceed 16 per cent of
Shareholders' Funds and profits after tax for any year
in excess of the maximum permitted return will be
apportioned 80 per cent to the Development Fund and 20
per cent to Shareholders' Funds which will be issued as
bonus shares at an appropriate time.56 Like that of the
bus fanchises, the Development Fund is to serve a
profit equalisation fund out of which no transfer will
be made except for the purpose of maintaining or
reducing rental charges.57
In 1987 the number of telephone per 100 people has
reached 46.96, i.e., almost two persons will possess a
telephone.58 And within a decade, the number of
telephone subscribers has doubled from 994,000 in 1977
to 1,975,000 in 1987.59 This was attributed in part by
the rates which have been kept at a reasonable range
so that more and more people can afford to own a
telephone.
By Grant of Right of Construction Operation
Honakona Tramways Peak Tramways
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The Tramway Ordinance passed in 1901 resulted in the
formation of the Hongkong Tramway Electric Co., Ltd.
(subsequently re-named the Hongkong Tramways Co., Ltd.)
which granted it the right to consturct and run the
tramway as delineated on a plan deposited with the
Director of Highways and approved by the Governor-in-
Council (S.3). In similar fashion, the Peak Tramway
Ordinance enacted in 1883 conferred the Hong Kong High
Level Tramways Co. (re-named Peak Tramways Co., Ltd. in
1905) the right to construct and operate a tramway
commencing from the southwest boundary of Inland Lot
7977 and terminating on the boundary of Rural Building
Lots 768 and 858 in accordance with the plan deposited
with the Director of Land (S.2A 3).
Previously the grant of right of operation for Hongkonc
Tramways extended on a short-term five-yearly period.
The Government let it decide on commercial grounds SOME
time in 1986-87 whether to continue operations it
competition with the MTR Island Line due to open that
time and the improved roads.60 The Company, now owned
by the Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. of Y.K. Pao, subsequently
elected to go on with the business. A major
refurbishment programme was then inaugurated to boost
its appeal.61 The fares have remained unchanged for
many years at as low as 60 cents for adults, 30 cents
for students and 20 cents for children, although any
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alteration of the fares is subject to the consent of
the Governor-in-Council (S.51, Tramway ordinance).
In contrast the Peak Tramways which runs on a ten-year
period of right of operation, was deregulated, by ar
amendment of the Ordinance in 1986, to fix its fares
freely.62 The Government may take over and purchase the
two tramways at a fair value in case the company is
insolvent, so that it is unable to maintain the service
with advantage to the public or discontinues the
working of the tramways for the space of six months not
being occasioned by circumstances beyond the control of
the company (S.28-30, Tramway Ordinance, and S.9-11,
Peak Tramway Ordinance). The companies are als
the tramways to the military authorities for the
transporation of personnel and materials by an order of
the Governor-in-Council (S.44, Tramway Ordinance, and
S.19, Peak Tramway Ordinance.)
By Contractual Agreements
China Light Hongkong Electric
Electric supply as mentioned is an essential public
service which is most economically provided tc
customers in a georgraphical area by a monopoly. The
required in times of emergency to give exclusive use of
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highly capital-intensive nature of electricity
production and distribution, together with the highly
beneficial economies of scale, makes provision of the
service on a competitive basis impractical and
unrealistic. Hong Kong has two electric monopolies,
although some minor enterprises such as village
cooperatives produce electricity for certain remote
locations in the New Territories, serving separate
geographical areas. Hong Kong Island and the
neighbouring islands of Ap Lei Chau and Lamma are
supplied with electricity by the Hongkong Electric Co.,
Ltd., whereas Kowloon and the New Territories--
including Lantau, Cheung Chau, and a number of other
outlying islands-- receive their supply from China
Light Power Co., Ltd.63
Hongkong Electric is one of the oldest power companies
in the world, having been founded in 1889.64 At the end
of 1986, the Company had 387,340 consumers, of whom
314,600 were classified as being domestic users. The
maximum demand for the year was 1,259 MW and sales of
electricity amounted to 17,346 million megajoules.65
The Company is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
Hongkong Electric Holdings Ltd. It opened its first
station in Wan Chai, and later moved to North Point in
1921. The North Point Station was finally
decommissioned in 1980. The Company's generating
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activities are at present based on Ap Lei Chau and
Lamma.66
China Light was formed in 1901, first to provide
Kowloon with electric lighting. Its first station was
commissioned in 1903 at Hung Hom and in 1920 added
another at Hok Un. In 1931 the supply was extended to
the New Territories.67 Closely tied with the rapid
industrialisation of the territory especially in the
Kowloon side, major expansion of China Light took place
in the post-war years-68 At that time the demand for
electricity was increasing at such a rate that the
Company could not keep pace. Capital was unavailable
for the major plant expansion required and the
Government frowned on financing expansion out of its
own revenue, although there was much talk of
nationalising the industry-69
At the height of the crisis, Esso Stanaara Eastern,
Inc., of America and China Light reached an investment
agreement which led to the formation in 1964 the
Peninsula Electric Power Co., Ltd. (PEPCO). Esso,
through a subsidiary, Eastern Energy, Ltd., has a 60
per cent interest and China Light 40 per cent in
PEPCO.70 Two other companies with shareholdings being
identical to those for PEPCO, were formed afterwards:
the Kowloon Electricity Supply Co., Ltd. (KESCO)
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established in 1978 which owns the Castle Peak 'A'
Station and some facitlites at Hok Un and the Castle
Peak Power Co., Ltd. (CAPCO) in 1981 which owns the
Castle Peak 'B' Station.71 These companies are solely
power generating enterprises which sell all their
outputs to China Light for transmission and
distribution.
By 1986 China Light supplies electricity to more than
1,250,000 consumers. The maximum demand for the year
reached 3,355 MW while sales amounted to 50,582 million
megajoules, half of those going to industrial and
commercial customers.72 The history of China Light was
claimed to have set a good example for solving power-
shortage problems in many cities of the world. As a
manager of the Company put it in 1970, Electricity [in
Hong Kong] has been transformed from a luxury commodity
into a necessity. Electrical power is becoming
available to even the most remote villages.73
The two power companies do not operate on a franchise,
licence nor a right granted by statute, but the Schemes
of Control Agreements (SCAs). As noted by Ernst
Whinney, a power consultant, In Hong Kong, the SCA,
together with their administration, define the free
market umbrella under which the electric utilities
overate. The SCA is a contractual agreement between the
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Government and the utilities which specifies a limited
set of financial and other terms and conditions of
utility operation.i74 In 1964 after the Government had
declined to nationalise power supply and the formation
of PEPCO, it signed the SCA with China Light which was
subsequently amended in 1978 to form its present
version.75 In the drawing up of the SCAs which is
effective for a period of 1.10.78- 30.9.93 for China
Light and 1.1.79- 31.12.93 for Hongkong Electric, the
Government recognises that the companies and their
shareholders are entitled to earn a return which is
reasonable in relation to the risks involved and
capital invested in and retained in the business, and
in return, the Government has to be assured that
service to the consuming public continues to be
adequate to meet demand, to be efficient and of high
quality, and is provided at the lowest cost which is
reasonable in the light of financial and other
considerations.76 The main features of the arrangements
in the SCAs are as follows:77
1. The Schemes shall be applicable to the
electricity-related activities of the companies
2. Before implementation, adjustments in tariff
schedule shall be subject to review by and in
concultation with the Government and approval by
the Executive Council
3. The annual permitted return to be the sum of:
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13.5 per cent of the average net fixed
assets and
- a further 1.5 per cent on any average net
fixed assets financed by shareholders'
investments after 30 September, 1978, as
defined in the Scheme.
4. Any difference between the permitted return and
the profit for the SCA to be transferred to or
from a Development Fund
5. The main purpose of the Development Fund is to
assist in the acquisition of fixed assets and it
is not part of distributable shareholders'
funds.
6. The following to be deducted from the permitted
return:
a charge of 8 per cent per annum on the
average balance of the Development Fund, such
charge to be credited to a rate reduction
reserve to be applied as rebates to
customers and
interest payable, up to maximum of 8 per cent
per annum, on long-term financing.
7. Financing reviews will be conducted jointly by
the Government and the companies. For each
financing review, the companies will make
available their revenue and capital budgets, as
wP11 as financial models covering the preceding,
148
the current ano at least tour subsequent years.
The results of each financing review will be put
to the Executive Council for approval.
8. An auditing review will be conducted jointly by
the Government and the companies in November or
December of each year when all necessary
documents are available.
The SCAs were kept confidential for many years. In late
1982 in an outcry against a tariff increase of the two
power companies, the public, joint with a number of
Legislative councillors, demanded the disclosure of the
documents to remove the air of mystery that had
surrounded them.78 The Government finally decided,
after securing the consent of the companies concerned,
to publish all the SCAs including those for the bus and
telephone utilities that we have dwelt on above.79 But
the publication had not helped ease the public doubts
and apprehension on the increase of electricity charges
to be effective from 1 January, 1983.80
Allen Lee, an outspoken Legislative Councillor
representing at the time the Hong Kong Federation of
Industries, maintained that there are some people in
Hong Kong, but very few, who believe that permitted
return of 15 per cent based on average net fixed assets
is to limit the power companies' profitability. On the
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other hand, there are many... who believe it is a
guaranteed profit regardless of economic
environment.81 To illustrate his point by figures, he
said: In the case of China Light, net return increased
from $238 million in 1978 to $919 million in 1982. On
yearly basis, the increase of net return percentage
from 1978 to 1982 is 34 per cent, 50 per cent, 45 per
cent, and 31 per cent respectively. During the same
period, the average net fixed assets increased from
$1,863 million to $9,290 million.i82 He therefore on
behalf of the Federation of Hong Kong Industires, urged
the Government to set up a tripartite commission which
consists of Government officials, representatives from
the power companies and the general public to review
the SCA to ensure that the shareholders' interests are
accounted for and the consumers' interests are also
protected.83
W.C.L. Brown, a prominent banker ana also a 1,te-y1.51aLl.vc
Councillor, however presented another view, apparently
backing up the shareholders' interests. He professed
that whichever way one looks at it [the SCA], any
fairminded person must surely agree that in Hong Kong
we enjoy standards of service from our utilities which
compare favourably with most other territories both in
terms of reliability and in cost...If we take the
October 1982 figures, their charges compared favourably
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with seven neighbouring areas (Korea, Singapore, Japan,
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan). ThE
average electricity cost per unit for commercial
consumers was lower in Hong Kong than in all of thesE
countries, the exception being Taiwan where Government
subsidy is involved. In the case of domestic consumers,
it was lower in all countries except Thailand and
Taiwan84
Brown further argued that the claim levelled against
the power companies was not justified also in terms of
financing: The duration of the Schemes extends until
1993 and such a period is necessary to provide the
continuity of essential for the planning and financing
of major projects. Substantial international loans
totalling many billions of dollars have been arranged
on the security of the Schemes in their present form.
These loans were advanced only after the lenders had
satisfied themselves that their security was assured
through the SCA.i85
Moreover he did not think the SCA should be monitorea
by an independent body, for in the light of the review
and control functions performed by Government, the
establishment of any public monitoring of electricity
utilities would be a duplication of what is already
,o nn crone and would be of doubtful benefit to
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consumers.i86
John Bremridge, the then Financial Secretary, in
defending the SCAs and Government's utility policies,
seemed to share his conviction with Brown's. He was of
the opinion that on the whole in Hong Kong we have
good utility services at prices at least comparable
with others in Asia.O In fact in 1959 the Mould
Commission recommended the establishment of an
authority to generate, transmit and distribute
electricity. This involved nationalisation of the two
power companies. Lucky Hong Kong to avoid such a fate.
If a take-over of the two companies was undertaken
today, my exceedinly rough calculations show that fair
compensation of about $20 billion would be needed. With
10 per cent Government bonds and a ten-year sinking
fund less earnings the annual cost would be at least $2
billion, and the burden of management would be
transferred to Government. At present in Hong Kong our
annual corporate profits tax yields about $6.8 billion
per year. Would those who believe in nationalisation
accept the need for corporate profits tax to be
increased by 29 per cent?.. .Refusal to allow a 10 per
cent across the board increase in electricity charges
could involve Government in paying a subsidy to the
companies of $600 million per year. Salarie tax this
year will yield about $2.2 billion. How do you feel
152
about a 30 per cent increase?i88 As to the
establishment of a standing commission to regulate the
two power companies, the Financial Secretary did not
support the proposal as he contended, It must be clear
where management responsibility lies. And it can never
lie with a committee. I totally reject any concept of a
monitoring and interfering committee.89
In recent period, the investment strategy of China
Light has been concentrating on developing the much
cheaper coal-fired generation in Castle 'A' and 'B'
stations.90 (Thus the first coal-fired generator
installed at 'A' Station can save as much as $1 million
per day over oil usage.)91 As a result, according to
the saying of China Light, electricity charges have
been maintained at a stable level (50 per cent of
electric rates arising from fuel cost) 92 since 1985,
which actually represent a fall in real terms when
inflation is taken into account-93 True or false, it is
however certain that the substitution of coal for oil
in electricity generation, which involves huge capital
costs, is largely attributed to the permitted return
provision of the SCAs.
Summary
Franchises, as we demonstrated above, are in fact very
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much like contracting. In a franchise or its variant,
some certain kind of governmental activities anc
functions are handed over to private enterprises under
a particular set of terms and conditons as stipulates
in the franchise contracts. Franchises differ fron
contracting not in their nature, but in the scope. it
can be seen that comparatively speaking, franchises arc
large-scale contracts, involving much bigger
investments and longer span of time. Besides they are a
monopolistic arrangement which is best suited for
delivering utility services.
In Hong Kong most, if not all, utilities have been
turned over to either public corporations (see Chapter
II), or private concerns including public-private
joint-stock companies through franChise arrangements.
The only exception being water supply which is still
under Government control as it involves vast areas of
land that allegedly have made privatisation
difficult.94
As remarked by A.H. Hanson, The privatisation of
utilities assumes the existence of entrepreneurs
willing and able to undertake the service on behalf of
the municipality. If it is to work properly, it also
demands that the municipality itself shall have the
competence to exercise the necessary supervision. These
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two conditions are not always present.95 In the less
developed countries (LDCs), the public sector has
always been considered to be more well-established than
private enterprises, in terms of the pool of human and
factor resources.96 It is widely recognised that some
form of public ownership and operation of the utilities
is desirable in those countries as the private sector
is lacking both the financial strength and
administrative competence to provide an economical and
efficient service.97
Hong Kong has long developed a strong and mature
private sector which renders this problem obsolete. At
present most utility companies are in the hands of a
few tycoons of the territory, like Y.K. Pao who runs
Star Ferry, Cross-Harbour Tunnel and Hongkong Tramways
through the Wharf (Holding) Ltd., Li Ka Shing (Hongkong
Electric), Lawrence Kadoorie (China Light and Peak
Tramways) or some reputable multi-national
corporations, such as Kumagai Gumi of Japan (Eastern
Harbour Crossing) and Cable Wireless of Britain (Hong
Kong Telephone and Cable Wireless (HK) Ltd). As a
monetary centre of the world, the problem of financing
for utility projects is almost non-existent.
Many of the private utility companies lri uLiC WG11-
hankrunt for one reason or another, and the alternative
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was always a destined government take-over.98 Until
lately, this has never happened to Hong Kong, not even
in HYF and CMB, both of which have been run by the same
parties, i.e., the Lau's and Ngan's families, since
their start of operation more than half a century ago.
As the former Financial Secretary, John Bremridge, puts
it, We thus encourage private enterprise. Most serves
us well. Some arguably does not. But forced
sequestration-- say nationalisation-- is wholly alien
to us. 19 9
In the regulation of utilities, the Government aims to
shareholders and consumers. But it tends to have laid
more emphasis on upkeeping the financial viability of
utility companies for long-term investments. The more
direct form of monitoring by regulatory agencies with
public elements and armed with extensive authorities
prevailing in America and other countries, has not been
adopted. (The Transport Advisory Committee is still not
a regulatory commission in a formal sense, see above).
None the less, Hong Kong's utilities would admittedly
compare favourably with most other territories, as
Bremridge again cynically puts it, Our bus companies
are not everyone's friends. But at least they provide
reasonably sufficient services at a price well below
those found in Sinaapore. Do people really believe that
strike a balance between the interests of the
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Government ownership could do better? Our telephone
company, though regularly execrated, is probably the
cheapest. and best in the world. Our electricity
companies, though subject to constant attack, offer
electricity cheaper than most in Asia, a reliable





By modes of organisations, the privatised sector in
Hong Kong consists of public corporations, subvented
organisations, and private companies. Public functions
are turned over to these structures through the
institutional arrangements of corporatisation,
subsidies, voucher arrangements, contracting,
franchises, and joint-stock companies. Unilke other
places, the Government has operated none of the private
goods, like oil, sugar, iron and steel, etc. until
lately there is not a single case of asset sales (the
KCRC would be one if it was listed on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange) which are popularly associated with the
privatisation of that kind of commodities, in Hong
Kong.1 Our study shows that each of the above methods
of privatisation tends to have its own domain of
service choice. Thus contracting can best apply to
services which are not large in scope and have specific
outputs as opposed to franchises which are suited for
services like utilities that require a monopoly to
support their large-scale production and long-term
investment. On the other hand, subsidies are a good
means for the privatisation of existing services
discharged by the private non-profit or voluntary
organisations, which the public authorities otherwise
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want to provide and corporatisation, in the Hong Kong
context, is proven a suitable device for hiving-off
certain public bureaus, with the Government retaining
the full ownership of the operation.
Regardless the mode of organisation they take, the
undertakings found in the privatised sector are quasi-
public and quasi-private in nature, that is, they arE
hybrid organisations which are created out of a min
of private business and governmental elements. Thus ir
both public corporations and subvented organisations,
the Government finances their operations, but the
management and production functions are taken over by
private parties. The private companies in that
sector, chiefly the contractors and franchised
operators, also exhibit a high degree of publicness,
considering, among other things, the restrictions
imposed on their property rights. From a legal point of
view, an owner shall enjoy the occupation, use, profit
and disposition over his own property-2 The companies
engaging in Government contracting or operating under
franchise arrangements are both denied the freedom of
making profits which are controlled by Government. And
for the latter, the right of disposition is deprived as
well, because the franchised operator cannot freely
transfer his company's assets to other people but only
the Government in case the franchise is revoked (see
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Chapter IV).
The publicness of all the three modes o
organisations for privatisation is also denoted by the
governmental control and regulation they are speciall:
subject to, given the public interest with which the,
all are involved. In comparing the formal design, it is
obvious that the control casted on public corporation!
is most minimal. The other end of the spectrum is
private utility companies. Thus in respect of feE
charging, the former can fix fares at their own will
but the latter cannot. The fact that public
corporations are wholly-owned by Government whereas
utility companies are dominated by private shareholderE
may account for the difference in treatment. But onE
feature in common to them in the control mechanism is
Peter N.S. Lee, under the political system of Hong Konc
which has little checks and balance, the Governor could
become a small dictator, based on the extensive
authorities he is given.3 All final decisions
concerning the operation such as setting the fares,
appointment of board members and Government directors
and revocation of franchises, are vested in him (often
in the name of the Governor-in-Council) rather than the
respective policy secretaries, i.e., the ministers in
the western sense. Moreover under the doctrine of
the preponderance of the Governor. As pointed out by
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"administrative absolutism,4 the Government would tend
to retain steadfastly a direct control of all public
affairs. This explains the rejection of formal
democratic control or public monitoring of any kind
including the formation of statutory regulatory
commissions in the supervision of the privatised
services. In short, the present arrangement is to put
the emphasis on administrative control through heavy
legislations which set out in detail all the functions
and powers to which the Government is entitled and the
duties and responsibilities the privatised sector is
obliged. The paucity or absence of any public and
legislative control might induce and aggravate people's
discontent on the privatised services as can be shown
by the proliferation of disputes between the two in
recent years.
As explicated in the Introduction, prlvazisaclori nay
long been existing in Hong Kong since its founding in
1841, with the persistence of a non-interventionist
approach and adoption of conservative fiscal and
budgetary polices by the Government. It however gained
further momentum in the 1980s. It is worth noting that
besides the possible influences of international trends
and other political considerations, this might also be
attributable to the change of economic and social base
in Hona Kona over the last two decades. During 1970-87,
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riding on the success of the post-war industrialisatior
in the earlier period, Hong Kong's economy in terms of
increase of GDP and GDP per capita grew at a rate of
8.8 per cent and 6.6 per cent respectively, which are
much higher than most other economies in the world. By
1982 Hong Kong was second after Japan in GDP per capita
in Asia.5 The rapid economic growth also brought about
significant improvement in the general living standard
of people. A social corollary to this is the rise of
the middle classs, the professional and managerial
strata of society.6 The economic logic of privatisation
is based on the greater efficiency and more rational
allocation of resources by virtue of the market forces.
The emphasis on affordability, to disregard the
distributive justice and equity concerns, may cater to
the needs and aspirations of the middle class and those
whose living is rapidly improving, who look for a
better standard of say, medical services and housing.
Thus there has been existing for many years the call
for increasing the number of B class beds in the
public and subvented hospitals by that sector of the
community, and the endless demand for the Home
Ownership flats with better amenities shown by the long
waiting list also manifests the social base for a
privatised public policy.7
The other aspect of economic growth is the nuture of a
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mature private sector in terms of entrepeneurship and
capital formation. So as told by Colin Sankey, the
Principal Assistant Financial Secretary, one of the
considerations which is fundamental, of the Government
in the privatisation drive in recent years is related
with the development of the market. He held that The
current condition of operation of the commercial sector
has reached such a stage that is capable of absorbing
some jobs which are not necessarily done by the
Government..... .The private sector had matured
sufficiently for the Government to allow it to operate
public services more competitively.i8 To illustrate how
the quality of the private sector affects the
performance of privatisation, we have contrasted, inter
alia, the success of the Hong Kong utilities operated
by private companies with the failure of those
counterparts in the LDCs (see Chapter IV). Suffice it
to say that privatisation, as a development strategy,
seems to be a viable option most likely for a more
arlvanrPH gcciety or an industrial economy.
We thus witness in privatisation the withering away
or rolling back of the state, the modernising agent
for many late industrialisers,9 not in the Leninist
sense, but in the way that more and more state
functions and activities are assigned to bodies
formally or informally separated from the state.
163
Patrick Dunleavy suggests that government will turn tc
a control agency if this trend goes on. And the upper
echelon of the state bureaucracy will welcome it, fo7
they would prefer working in a staff agency
concentrating on planning and monitoring to linE
agencies which have to execute the policies and facE
public pressure.1-0 Indeed contract city, a name giver
to American municipal governments which have contracted
out almost the whole range of public services tc
external parties, has become increasingly popular.11 A
similar suggestion along this line is what raised by
Steven N.S. Cheung. In trying to chart out the future
institutions of Hong Kong after 1997, he brought up the
idea of delegating all governmental functions to an
independent statutory body named the Hong Kong,
Incorporated.1-2 Under the China factor, this most
extreme version of the development of privatisation
will certainly not happen to Hong Kong, although the
Basic Law, as declared in its final draft, will to the
contrary retain the low tax policy previously pursued
in Hong Kong and the principle of keeping expenditure
within the limits of revenues in drawing up its
budget, that is, to strive for a fiscal balance,
avoid deficits and ensure that the budget is
commensurate with the growth rate of its gross domestic
product,13 which are exactly the policies that have
Pncouraaed the private provisions of public services
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and goods in the past history of Hong Kong.
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